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Abstract
This thesis project studies a simulation of decentralised bilateral ex-
change economics, in which prices are private information and trading
decisions are left to individual agents. We set to re-engineer the model
devised by Herbert Gintis and take his Delphi version as the basis for
providing a new, portable barter economics simulation tool in Java. By
introducing some extension points for new agent and market behaviours,
we provide simple means to implement variations on the original model.
In particular, our system could be used to study the emergent properties
of heterogeneous agent behaviours.
Through the addition of some default visualisation models we pro-
vide means for an improved intuitive understanding of the interaction
between individual agents.
The multi-agent simulation library MASON is used as the underlying
simulation platform. The results of running the software with various
parameters are compared to the results from the original version to
confirm the convergence of the two programs.
Acknowledgements
Foremost we thank our supervisor Sibylle Schupp, for always being very
kind and encouraging.
Sara Landolsi and Johan Tykesson for statistics help, Anders Moberg
for some proofreading and suggestions for chapter 5.
Ma¨rt Kalmo for being our opponent. And last but definitely not
least, Kaija & Hanna for putting up with us during periods of intense
work.
Contents
1 Introduction 12
2 Background 13
2.1 Simulation as a way of making science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Importance of replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Agent-Based Computational Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Advantages of agent-based approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 Construction of agent-based models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 MASON multi-agent simulation toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 The architecture of MASON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Gintis’ Barter Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Overview of the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Analysis of the implementations 22
3.1 Original implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.1 Deviations from the paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Generalisation of the barter economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.1 The GenEqui project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 New implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.1 Adapting to MASON’s architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.2 Ensuring local correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.3 Serialisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.4 Thread safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4 Extensibility 34
4.1 Possible uses for the application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2 Safety/correctness aspects of extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Extending agents on the individual level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.1 Barter strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.2 Improvement strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3.3 Replacement/mutation strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7
5 Scalability 39
5.1 Asymptotic time complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2 Analysis of the barter-algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.1 Complexity of init . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.2 Complexity of improve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2.3 Complexity of reproduceAndMutate . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2.4 Complexity of runPeriod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2.5 Complexity of main . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3 Testing the performance of different parameter sets . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.3.1 Test environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.4 Possible gains from concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6 Convergence 48
6.1 Global testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.2 Random number generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3 Our definition of similarity for price convergence . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.1 Similarity statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.2 Actual testing procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.4 Level of replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7 Further work 58
7.1 Parallelisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.2 Different ways of outputting data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.3 Dynamically loadable extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.4 Visualisation of different strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8 Conclusions 59
Bibliography 61
Appendices
A User documentation 64
A.1 Installation instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2 Using the program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2.1 The About tab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2.2 The Model and Displays tabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2.3 The Average Score chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.2.4 The Average Price chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.2.5 The Producer Shares chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.2.6 The Standard Deviation chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
8
A.2.7 Visualising the agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.2.8 Inspecting an agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B Developer documentation 70
B.1 The strategy interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.2 Running the model with custom strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C Delphi pseudo-random number generation 73
C.1 Flaws in the original Delphi V7 generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
C.1.1 Testing the generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
C.1.2 Practical significance of poor properties of the Delphi PRNG 74
C.2 KISS generator in Delphi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
D Comparisons of Gk and J for some parameter sets 79
9
List of Figures
3.1 Class definition for Agent in the original implementation of the barter
economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Our implementations J , Jl & Jn with different bugs fixed compared
to the original implementation Gk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 The class structure for the new implementation using MASON . . . 29
3.4 Instance variables in the TradeAgent class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Checking a class invariant with the assert statement . . . . . . . . 31
3.6 Comparing the total amount of a traded good before and after the
trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.7 Restoring an instance of TradeAgent class from its serialised form . 32
4.1 Barter strategy interface and our implementation of a function equiv-
alent to Gintis’ implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Improvement strategy interface and our implementation of a function
equivalent to Gintis’ CopyAndMutate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 Replacement/mutation strategy interface and our implementation of
a strategy (RDJ) equivalent to RD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Time taken in seconds for running our program for 1000 periods, using
the default parameters and varying the number of goods. . . . . . . 47
6.1 Time series and averages for 3 time slices of a good in a test run. . . 50
6.2 Empirical CDFs and KS-test probabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3 Empirical CDFs for different sized samples and parameters. . . . . . 54
A.1 The About tab with the model description in the MASON console . 65
A.2 The Model and Displays tab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.3 The Average Score chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.4 The Average Price chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.5 The Producer Shares chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.6 The Standard Deviation chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.7 Visualised agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.8 A low scoring agent (on the left) vs. a high scoring agent . . . . . . 69
10
A.9 Selecting an agent for inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A.10 Inspecting the prices of an individual agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.1 Interface methods of the strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.2 Telling the i-th agent to improve its prices based on j-th agent. . . . 71
B.3 Initialising the model with custom strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
D.1 Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the number of goods set to 5 and 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
D.2 Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the number of agents per good set to 10 and 1000. . . . . . . . . . . 81
D.3 Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
∆mutation set to 0.75 and 0.9975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
D.4 Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the maximum number of trade attempts set to 3 and 30. . . . . . . . 83
D.5 Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk
showing just the results of rank-sum test; various parameters. All
periods in multiples of 1000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
11
Chapter 1
Introduction
Simulation is a young and rapidly growing field, useful in many different disciplines
of social sciences. Economics is one of those for which simulation is very well suited—
the models tend to be complex, non-linear systems that are intractable using other
approaches such as mathematical modelling. In this thesis, we study the simulation
of a particular economic model—barter economy. It is a simple economic model
where agents exchange goods without money or other real-life factors such as firms,
taxes, capital or material. Despite the simplicity, the dynamics of barter economies
is not completely understood.
The particular model we study in this project was formulated by Herbert Gintis
in [Gin06]. A proof of concept implementation in the Delphi programming language
is provided from his home page.
The interesting result of Gintis’ work is that in a decentralised economy, where
trading agents have neither money nor prices as public information and with little
central control, a system of approximately equilibrium prices emerges in the long
run.
We aim to reproduce the original results and functionality by reimplementing the
model in Java. We also provide means to study related models by way of extending
the program by changing agent as well as market behaviour.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Simulation as a way of making science
One of the first uses of computers in a large-scale simulation was during World War
II to model the process of nuclear detonation [Met87]. Ever since, the number of
applications for computer simulation has been growing—it is now used to gain in-
sight into the operation of natural systems in physics, chemistry, biology, economics,
psychology, social sciences and possibly in various other disciplines. All of this has
been made possible due to the rapid growth of computing power.
The increasing use of simulations raises an important question: what is the value
of simulation as a way of making science? Robert Axelrod [Axe03] tries to answer
this question by comparing simulation to the two standard methods of doing science:
induction and deduction. Induction is a form of reasoning that makes generalisations
based on individual instances. In social sciences, the examples of using induction
could be the analysis of opinion surveys and macro-economic data. Deduction, on
the other hand, is reasoning which uses deductive arguments to move from given
statements (premises) to conclusions, which must be true if the premises are true.
Amy Greenwald [Gre97] brings an example of deductive reasoning in classical game
theory—if all the players are rational, and if they all know that they all are rational,
and so on, then they all know that all the others play best responses, and as a
result, they all play best responses to those best responses, which brings us to an
equilibrium where no player has anything to gain by changing his or her own strategy.
This is called Nash equilibrium and the discovery of this was reached by deduction
[Nas50]. So, where does simulation belong? Axelrod thinks that simulation is a third
way of doing science, as it combines elements from both standard methods. Like
deduction, it starts with a set of explicit assumptions and then generates data that
can be analysed inductively. Simulation does not prove any theorems like deduction
and the simulated data does not come from direct measurement of the real world as
is the case for typical induction. Rather, the data comes from a rigorously specified
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set of rules. Axelrod concludes that while induction can be used to find patterns
in data, and deduction can be used to find consequences of assumptions, simulation
modelling can be used to aid intuition.
In 1969, Thomas Schelling used simulation to show how racial segregation hap-
pens even if individuals have a small preference for the skin colour of their neighbours
[Sch69]. Schelling did not use any computers for this simulation. In his later book
[Sch78], he even pointed out what is needed to replicate the results:
“Some vivid dynamics can be generated by any reader with a half-hour
to spare, a roll of pennies and a roll of dimes, a tabletop, a large sheet
of paper, a spirit of scientific inquiry, or, lacking that spirit, a fondness
for games.”
Placing the pennies and dimes in different patterns on the “board” and then mov-
ing them one by one if they had too many neighbours of different colour were all
there was to it. Despite the simplicity of the simulation, it nevertheless fulfilled
the main purpose of aiding intuition—anyone could easily understand the theory by
replicating the simulation. Of course, computers can simulate this much faster and
we can carry out the same process hundreds of times per second, but this adds little
value once we have understood the theory by doing it on paper. The paper method
is possible because the model is so simple and no heavy calculations are necessary.
However, if we have an economic model with several parameters and significantly
more individuals acting, the only option is computer simulation. No matter whether
we use a computer or not, the main value of simulation is to better understand the
operation or the behaviour of a system.
2.1.1 Importance of replication
Just as important as it is to understand some phenomenon of a complex system, is
sharing the insights with others. Axelrod [Axe03] brings out several difficulties that
arise when sharing the results of a computer simulation. One of the main things
he is concerned with is whether the shared results of a simulation are reproducible.
Schelling did an excellent job in this regard, his work is easy to replicate. Unfortu-
nately, this is often not the case for computer simulations. The models are usually
sensitive to many, small details and describing them all would not fit in an article,
making it hard for others to replicate or even understand the results. So, it is very
important to find other means of providing the documentation and source code of
the computer simulation together with the interpretation of the results.
Once all the details of a simulation are made available, it is also very important
that someone tries to replicate it. According to Axelrod, this is virtually never done:
“New simulations are produced all the time, but rarely does any one stop
to replicate the results of any one else’s simulation model.” [Axe03]
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He even calls replication one of the hallmarks of cumulative science and emphasises
that it is needed to confirm whether the claimed results of a given simulation are
reliable in the sense that they can be reproduced by someone starting from scratch.
The basis for this suggestion is that it is easy to make programming errors, especially
for those with little programming experience. This, in turn, could lead to mistaken
results or misrepresentation of what was actually simulated. Or, there could be
errors in analysing or reporting the results.
2.2 Agent-Based Computational Economics
At the intersection of economics and computation, lies a fairly new field called agent-
based computational economics (ACE)—the computational study of economies mod-
elled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents [Tes03]. The reason why
economists are discovering the possibilities of agent-based modelling is that a cer-
tain class of economic problems is not solvable with mathematical models [Axt00].
The reason why these ideas have not been put into practice for centuries is that
agent-based modelling was not feasible until computer hardware became powerful
enough to carry out those computation-intensive simulations. But now, for these
mathematically intractable problems, agents come in very handy. Tesfatsion [Tes03]
gives a precise definition of an “agent” in that context—it is a bundle of data and
behavioural methods, representing an entity constituting part of a computationally
constructed world. For example, an agent can represent individuals (e.g., consumers,
producers), social groupings (e.g., families, firms), institutions (e.g., markets, regu-
latory systems), biological entities (e.g., crops, livestock) or physical entities (e.g.,
infrastructure, weather). By creating a bunch of these simple agents and making
them interact with each other, we can model a complex system. A defining property
for complex systems formulated by Vicsek [Vic02] is that the laws describing the
behaviour of a complex system are qualitatively different from those that govern
its units. The “father” of agent-based modelling, Thomas Schelling, referred to the
existence of such systems in economics in his classic paper “Models of Segregation”
[Sch69]:
“Economists are familiar with systems that lead to aggregate results that
the individual neither intends nor needs to be aware of, the results some-
times having no recognisable counterpart at the level of the individual.”
For example, he names the creation of money by a commercial banking system or
the way that saving decisions cause depressions or inflation. Vicsek summarises the
benefits of agent-based approach to complex systems:
“By directly modelling a system made of many units, one can observe,
manipulate and understand the behaviour of the whole system much
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better than before. In this sense, a computer is a tool that improves not
our sight (as does the microscope or telescope), but rather our insight
into mechanisms within complex systems.” [Vic02]
ACE research has four objectives [Tes06]. Firstly, to empirically understand
why particular global regularities have evolved and persisted, despite the absence of
centralised planning and control. Those global regularities are the large-scale effects
of complex systems, indirect results of interacting individuals. Thus, the aim is to
generate those global regularities within agent-based worlds. Epstein [Eps06] calls
this a “generative” approach to science, the main question being how decentralised
local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the given regularity.
The second objective is normative understanding. Here the ultimate question
is how agent-based models can be used as laboratories for the discovery of good
economic designs. Again, an agent-based world is constructed, but this time the
aim is to assess how efficient, fair and orderly the outcomes of a specific economic
design are.
The third objective is qualitative insight and theory generation, with the main
question of how economic systems can be more fully understood through a sys-
tematic examination of their potential dynamical behaviours under different initial
conditions. Tesfatsion [Tes06] reasons that such understanding would help to clarify
not only why certain outcomes have regularly been observed but also why others
have not.
Finally, the objective also pursued by this thesis project, is methodological ad-
vancement. Researchers with this objective in mind try to find the best methods
and tools to undertake the rigorous study of economic systems. Tesfatsion lists the
needs of ACE researchers that the methodology should meet:
• Model structural, institutional, and behavioural characteristics of economic
systems.
• Formulate interesting theoretical propositions about their models.
• Evaluate the logical validity of these propositions by means of carefully crafted
experimental designs.
• Condense and report information from their experiments in a clear and com-
pelling manner.
• Test their experimentally-generated theories against real-world data.
In this thesis, we are more interested in the advancement of practical tools of pro-
gramming, visualisation and validation than in the advancement of methodological
principles.
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2.2.1 Advantages of agent-based approach
To further see the benefits of ACE, Robert Axtell brings out the advantages of agent-
based computational modelling over conventional mathematical theorising [Axt00].
Firstly, in agent-based computational models it is easy to limit rationality of
the agents. The agents do not need to act rationally, one can experiment with
different kinds of agents and just see what happens. In contrast, mathematical
models assume rational agents, just like physicists have the ideal gas and the perfect
fluid. Secondly, it is easy to make agents heterogeneous in agent-based models.
It is a matter of instantiating the agent population with different initial states or
behaviour strategies. Thirdly, Axtell points out that by “solving” the model merely
by executing it, we are left with an entire dynamical history of the process under
study. Therefore, it is possible to not only concentrate on the possible equilibria of
the model, but one can also study the dynamics of the process. As a final advantage,
he argues that in most social processes either physical space or social networks
matter, which are difficult to account for mathematically. In agent-based models
however, it is quite easy to have the agent interactions mediated by space or networks
or both.
Together with all these advantages, Axtell points out a significant disadvantage
that agent-based modelling methodology has when compared to mathematical mod-
elling. Namely, a single run of an agent model does not give us any information
about the robustness of the results. He raises a more formal question:
“Given that agent model A yields result R, how much change in A is
necessary in order for R to no longer obtain?” [Axt00]
The truth is that we can only answer this by running the model with systematically
varied initial conditions or parameters and then assess the robustness of results. This
of course limits the size of the parameter space that we can check for robustness in a
reasonable time. In mathematical economics, the question of parameter robustness
is often formally resolvable.
2.2.2 Construction of agent-based models
Tesfatsion [Tes06] compares the ACE methodology to a culture-dish approach in
biology—an ACE modeller first computationally constructs an economic world, pop-
ulates it with multiple interacting agents and then steps back and just observes the
development of that small world over time. The most important part of constructing
such a world is specifying the agent. An agent typically has data attributes (e.g.,
type of agent, info about other agents, utility function) and behavioural methods
(e.g., market protocol, private pricing strategy or learning algorithm). That is the
groundwork of agent-based models, what is left is the glue code to make the agents
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interact in some regular manner and at the same time advance the model in time.
The effort in this part can be greatly reduced by using some existing multi-agent
system framework. There are many choices for this, and in the next section we will
take a closer look at one of them. Eventually, every ACE model should have the
property of being dynamically complete, meaning that it must be able to develop
over time solely on the basis of agent interactions, without further interventions from
the modeller [Tes06].
2.3 MASON multi-agent simulation toolkit
Most of the agent-based models need some boilerplate code that is common among
all of them. Examples include a good random number generator, synchronisation
of agent interactions, visualisation and a graphical user interface for controlling the
simulation. This is a fair amount of work if starting from scratch, but in most
cases unnecessary because a large variety of frameworks (or toolkits or platforms)
exist for multi-agent systems, offering the described basic functionality and often
more. One of those frameworks, used in this project, is MASON1—Multi-Agent
Simulator Of Neighbourhoods (or Networks). This free and open-source general
purpose simulation toolkit is a joint effort of George Mason University’s Computer
Science Department and the George Mason University Center for Social Complexity.
Analysing the pros and cons of every existing framework would be enough work for
another thesis project, but the important criteria talking in favour of MASON are
the Java programming language (making it multi-platform), high performance and
thorough documentation.
A not so recent review [RLJ05] of agent-based simulation platforms found MA-
SON to be the fastest among four other popular platforms—Swarm and Java Swarm2,
Repast3 and NetLogo4. To date, over 50 platforms5 with similar goals exist, which
means that most of them remain undiscovered for this project.
2.3.1 The architecture of MASON
The motivation behind starting the MASON project in the first place was the need
for a general purpose simulation toolkit that would not be tied to any specific domain
[LCRPS04]. Other critical needs were speed, the ability to migrate a simulation run
from platform to platform and therefore also platform independence. The authors
of MASON argue that at the time when MASON development started, the existing
systems did not meet these needs well. They either tied the model to the GUI too
1http://cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/
2http://www.swarm.org
3http://repast.sourceforge.net
4http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABM_Software_Comparison
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closely, or could not guarantee platform-independent results, or were slow because
they were written in an interpreted language. The architectural choices of MASON
are to fix these problems.
MASON is written in Java in order to take advantage of its portability and
strict semantics for libraries and math operations to guarantee duplicable results.
Another useful feature is object serialisation, which enables saving a simulation
state to disk and restoring it later. From the architectural viewpoint, the toolkit
is modular and layered. The bottom layer consists of utility data structures, such
as custom implementations of Bag and Heap. Next comes the model layer. This is
the core of MASON and has all the functionality to create simulations with com-
mand line interfaces. This layer includes a single base class for the simulated model
(sim.engine.SimState), backed by functionality for scheduling agents and also a
high-quality pseudo-random number generator (see 6.2). MASON employs a specific
usage of the term agent—it is a computational entity which may be scheduled to
perform some action and possibly manipulate the environment [LCRPS04]. So, the
agents are scheduled to take action, or “step forward” in MASON’s terms, and the
only requirement for an agent is to implement a Steppable interface with a single
method that is called by MASON according to the schedule.
The model layer is completely independent of the visualisation layer. Neverthe-
less, attaching visualisations and a GUI for simulation control is straightforward.
For these purposes, another base class called GUIState is provided and very little
knowledge of the Java Swing GUI framework is required. The serialisation of the
model (SimState) to or from disk also happens through this class. For the visu-
alisation purposes, there are several classes to support drawing various 2D and 3D
representations of the model.
From a programmer’s perspective, MASON is low level and requires Java pro-
gramming skills to be able to construct one’s own agent-based model. The only
design concept enforced by MASON is its view of an agent as something that steps
forward in a series of discrete events. But there is a positive side of its generality—
the domains for which MASON is suitable ranges from robotics, machine learning
and artificial intelligence to multi-agent models of social systems [LCRPS04].
2.4 Gintis’ Barter Economy
One of the important questions in economics has for a long time been how to match
the demand and supply of all goods in a market of perfect competition, so that there
is neither excess demand nor supply. Or from another point of view, how to find the
market-clearing prices that would result in this match. The study of this problem
has its own branch in theoretical economics called General Equilibrium Theory, but
the first man to address these issues was the French economist Leon Walras (1834–
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1910). He proposed a dynamic process called taˆtonnement (or groping) by which
general equilibria might be reached.
The central part of this process is an (Walrasian) auctioneer who calls out prices
of goods after which agents register how much of each good they would like to offer
(supply) or purchase (demand) at the given price. No transactions or production
take place at disequilibrium prices. Instead, prices are lowered for goods with excess
supply and raised for goods with excess demand. Eventually, this process will give
rise to general equilibria.
Herbert Gintis demonstrates a different, agent-based approach [Gin06]. He con-
structs a simple economic model called barter economy, where agents just produce,
exchange, and consume a number of goods in many consecutive periods. No other
realistic factors such as money, firms, capital, or material are included. The major
difference from Walras’ model is that the described barter economy is completely
decentralised—no top-down control exists such as the Walrasian auctioneer with the
perfect information. Gintis sums up his approach:
“Rather than using analytically tractable but empirically implausible ad-
justment mechanisms and informational assumptions (such as Walrasian
taˆtonnement and prices as public information), we treat the economy
as complex system in which agents have extremely limited information,
there is no aggregate price-adjustment mechanism institution, and out
of equilibrium exchange occurs in every period.” [Gin06]
So, Gintis sets to extend the empirical understanding of the dynamics of barter
economy that would lead to an equilibrium.
2.4.1 Overview of the process
The following process devised by Gintis is carried out in each period to evolve the
economy over time. It begins with a synchronised production phase—each agent
starts with an empty inventory of goods and then produces a fixed amount of a
single good. The production phase is followed by an unsynchronised exchange-
consumption-production phase. Here the agents first seek exchange partners and
then try to agree on the amounts of exchanged goods according to their strategies. A
strategy for an agent is a price vector for the various goods it produces or consumes.
Agents only give away a quantity of their own production good and only if the
value of what they receive in exchange is at least as great as the value of what they
give away, according to their private price vector. After a successful trade, an agent
consumes an optimal consumption bundle and produces more of his production good
if his inventory becomes empty after the consumption.
The final phase is reproduction-mutation, which only happens after a certain
number of periods (for example every 10th period). In this phase, a fraction of
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low-scoring agents imitate the strategies (the private prices) of high-scoring agents
and with a small probability, each strategy undergoes a small mutation. This phase
can also be seen as the learning phase.
Repeating this process for a long enough time (on the order of 150 000 periods),
Gintis showed that the prices converge approximately to the market-clearing values
and thus an equilibrium is reached.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of the implementations
In this chapter, we look at two different implementations of the barter economy
model. First, we give an overview of Gintis’ original implementation constructed
from scratch in the Delphi programming language. Then, we study an alterna-
tive implementation of the same model built in Java, which we have implemented
ourselves using MASON.
3.1 Original implementation
The original implementation can be viewed as a proof of concept. It is written in
Delphi, a further development of Object Pascal, which enables rapid construction
of GUI applications on Windows platform. Although Delphi has object-oriented
language features such as encapsulation, polymorphism and inheritance, this imple-
mentation does not take advantage of those.
The core of the program is fitted into a single source file with nearly 1000 lines
of code. Most importantly, a clear distinction of what constitutes an agent has
been made. Fig. 3.1 shows the definition of the Agent class devised by Gintis.
Everything in this class has public access, even the private price vector. Thus, the
idea of missing public information is not directly projected to the code, as any agent
has access to the prices of any other agent. But this is a design issue and good
care has been taken to ensure that no agent reads the prices of another agent unless
they really need to—that is when they are scoring low and need to imitate someone
else’s strategy. One could argue that avoiding encapsulation like this would ease
the programming effort as everything is at hand when needed. But, at the same
time, the lack of encapsulation increases the coupling between different parts of the
program and results in hard to follow “spaghetti” code.
Another thing to notice is the four similar methods of Trade vs. CommonPrice-
Trade, Eat vs. CommonPriceEat, Lambda vs. CommonPriceLambda and SetDemand-
AndSupply vs. SetCommonPriceDemandAndSupply. In fact, there is very little dif-
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Agent = class(TObject)
Index, Produces : Integer;
Price, Inventory, Buy, ExchangeFor : Array of Double;
ProduceAmount, Score : Double;
Constructor Init(Produces, Index : Integer);
Procedure Copy(AgentIdx : Integer);
Procedure CopyAndMutate(AgentIdx : Integer);
Procedure Eat;
Procedure CommonPriceEat(EPrices : Array of Double);
Function Trade(B : Agent) : Boolean;
Function CommonPriceTrade(B : Agent; EPrices : Array of Double) : Boolean;
Function Lambda : Real;
Function CommonPriceLambda(EPrices : Array of Double) : Real;
Procedure SetDemandAndSupply;
Procedure SetCommonPriceDemandAndSupply(EPrices : Array of Double);
end;
Figure 3.1: Class definition for Agent in the original implementation of the barter
economy
ference between the two variants and CCFinder1, a token based clone detector,
suggests that they are all duplicates. In the worst case, when it comes to comparing
Trade to CommonPriceTrade, the size of an exact clone is over 50 lines long. The
only difference between a standard method and a CommonPrice* variant is that the
latter operates on a price vector passed as a parameter rather than on agent’s own
private prices.
To sum up, the code has not been written with replication in mind. Lack of
comments makes it even more difficult to extract the important details about the
model. Nevertheless, the implementation serves its purpose and confirms the results
presented in [Gin06].
3.1.1 Deviations from the paper
This section illustrates the need for reproducing simulation models—to detect pro-
gramming errors that might have affected the drawn conclusions. The original imple-
mentation has several deviations from what was described in the paper, or features
that obviously have not been intentional. Most of them have no effect on the price
convergence property of the model, but we will nevertheless look at them to provide
fixes in the re-implementation.
Firstly, a rather significant bug is introduced when calculating the demand vector
for an agent. Every agent wants to consume n goods in fixed proportions (o1, . . . , on).
If (x1, . . . , xn) is the inventory of an agent, then the utility function is defined as in
Eq. 3.1.
u(x1, . . . , xn) = min
0<j≤n
xj
oj
(3.1)
1http://www.ccfinder.net/
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It is not wise for agents to consume the whole amount of one particular good and
only a small fraction of some other good. To maximise the score, agents should try
to acquire equal proportions of all n goods. Gintis calculates the optimum inventory
(or demand) according to Eq. 3.2, where x∗ij denotes the optimum inventory for
good j of agent i and λ∗ is the proportion that would result in the highest utility.
x∗ij = λ
∗oj (3.2)
λ∗ =
∑
j
pijxij
∑
j
pijoj
(3.3)
The calculation of λ∗ is shown in Eq. 3.3. The numerator of this fraction is the
income constraint for an agent—the value of all goods in the inventory according
to an agent’s private prices. The denominator is the value that an agent ultimately
wants to consume, according to the private prices again. This is how the λ∗ calcula-
tion is presented in the paper and what seems reasonable. In Gintis’ implementation
however, λ∗ is calculated as in Eq. 3.4.
λ∗ =
∑
j
pijxij
∑
j
pijxij
= 1 (3.4)
So the question is what are the consequences to the results. Could this discrep-
ancy lead to different convergence behaviour? All agents will on average score lower
because they waste everything they produce to buy a single or a few other goods
instead of getting a little bit of everything and thus a better score. The global ef-
fect on the economy is shown in plots (e) and (f) of Fig. 3.2. Jl denotes our Java
implementation with the λ∗ calculation bug fixed and Gk is the original implemen-
tation. The plot (e) compares the means of the average relative prices2 in a 3-good3
economy. We can see how different the means are between Jl and Gk versions by
comparing them to the means in plot (a), where the Java version J has all the same
bugs as in Gk.
The same goes for the plots (f) and (b), except that they show the variance of
the average relative prices between different runs of the simulation.
2An average relative price for a good shows how much the price of the good differs from the
equilibrium price on the average (among all the agents). So, a value of −0.3 at some point means
that the average price is 30% lower from the equilibrium price at that point. The mean of those
prices just indicates that we have several runs of the same simulation.
3The price of one particular good is taken as the price unit for all the other goods. Thus, one
good always has a constant equilibrium price in the charts and is not shown.
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Figure 3.2: Our implementations J , Jl & Jn with different bugs fixed compared to
the original implementation Gk.
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Another discrepancy from the paper is how agents calculate the amount of their
produce-good that they are willing to exchange for other goods. Gintis calls the
trade initiating agent an “offerer” and defines the following procedure to determine
trade amounts:
“When Offerer i producing good g encounters agent j producing h 6= g,
he uses Eq. 3.2 and Eq. 3.3 to determine an amount xih > 0 of good h he
will accept in exchange for an amount xig ≡ pigxig/pih of his production
good g.”
Obviously the indices of xig ≡ pigxig/pih have gone wrong here—from agent i’s
point of view, the amount of good g it gives for good h is determined by finding the
value of what it would receive, i.e., pihxih, divided by the price of its production
good pig. So, the correct equation would be xig ≡ pihxih/pig and this is also how
the implementation looks like. But even though, this invariant is not preserved
throughout the simulation. At the start of every period, xig is calculated correctly
as described above for every possible good h 6= g. After successful trading however,
Gintis makes a shortcut and adjusts the amounts for both agents (i and j) as shown
in Eq. 3.5.
xg ← xg − givenAmount (3.5)
It proves to be correct for the offerer (agent i), because it gets to choose the trade
conditions and the amount it gives away will always reflect its prices. But for the
responder (agent j), this method gives wrong amounts because it accepts a trade if
pjgxig ≥ pjhxih; that is, when it values what it receives in trade at least as much
as what it gives up. In case the received value is strictly greater, the adjustment
of xjg by Eq. 3.5 will go wrong—agent j gives up less than it is willing to give up
and thus, next time it buys the same good, it gives up more than its private prices
would allow. The correct way would be to recalculate xig, every time xih changes,
from xig ≡ pihxih/pig.
The third bug that affects the simulation flow is from the reversed order of two
important events. After each trading period, Gintis first resets the demand (xh)
and supply (xg) for all agents. Then, if it happens to be a reproduce period, lower
scoring agents get a chance to copy, or “imitate”, the prices of better scoring agents.
After each such period, a bunch of agents who just got new price vectors, will
perform trades according to the old price vector, because the demand and supply
will not be recalculated until the next period. This also means trades with negative
profit, as did the previously described bug. The global effects of those two are not as
significant as with the bad λ∗ calculation. The plots (c) and (d) of Fig. 3.2 illustrate
the differences. Jn denotes our Java implementation with the the two bugs fixed
and Gk is the original implementation. We can see that the means in (c) are not
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very different from the means in (a), where the J version has all the bugs. The
same goes for the variances in plots (d) and (b).
Then there are a couple of minor bugs that have little or no effect on simulation
process. First, if agents are allowed to shift from producing one good to another,
giving the parameter producerShiftRate a value 0.01 does not mean that 1% of
all agents are going to shift their production good, but rather 0.01× totalAgents×
numGoods agents will shift4. It is hard to tell whether this behaviour was inten-
tional. Other bugs include a slight miscalculation of the standard deviation for
consumer and producer prices5 of a particular good; and crashing the program at
runtime when dividing the agents unequally between different production goods6.
The latter sometimes causes a call for a negative random number which in turn
raises an exception in the Delphi Random function.
We discuss one more conceptual difference between the paper and the implemen-
tation in 4.3.3, where it is more natural to explain.
3.2 Generalisation of the barter economy
The goal of agent-based modelling is not to provide as accurate representation of
some real world system as possible, but rather to enrich our understanding of them.
Creating an all-in-one general model does not take us closer to that goal, as it
becomes harder to grasp “what is causing what” if the parameter space grows too
large. Axelrod [Axe03] calls for adhering to the KISS principle, which stands for the
army slogan “keep it simple, stupid.” He explains:
“The KISS principle is vital because of the character of the research
community. Both the researcher and the audience have limited cognitive
ability. When a surprising result occurs, it is very helpful to be confident
that one can understand everything that went into the model.”
Does generalising the barter economy model mean abandoning the KISS principle?
If we think of generalisation as of adding other realistic factors to the same model,
then this definitely is a trade-off for simplicity. Such realistic factors could be the
agents consuming and producing an unlimited number of goods, or employing a
money good which is not consumed but only used in transactions, or introducing
other types of agents like firms that hire regular agents to produce goods. But as
Axelrod puts it, the complexity of agent-based modelling should be in the simulated
results, not in the assumptions of the model.
Another approach to generalisation is from the methodological point of view—
could we provide a general enough toolkit that allows modelling the barter economy
4In the ProducerShift procedure.
5The CalculateConsumerPriceStdDev and CalculateProducerPriceStdDev functions.
6At the start of the main function Button1Click.
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as it is, plus other roughly similar models from the same domain? Building such
a domain specific layer on top of MASON would require input from people with
economic background and still there would be a question of what is the common
part of all such economic models, if anything at all. It is not unlikely that the best
abstraction is close to what MASON provides. To illustrate the point, we study
another model devised by Gintis, called GenEqui.
3.2.1 The GenEqui project
The GenEqui project is a follow-up of the work on the barter economy. In the
corresponding paper [Gin07], Gintis studies the same kind of issues as in [Gin06].
The aim is to once again extend the empirical understanding of the dynamical
properties of the Walrasian general equilibrium model and to find an alternative
to the taˆtonnement process.
Although the goals of the two models are the same, the underlying agent-based
models differ substantially. GenEqui introduces firms and a Monetary Authority
who creates money by giving out loans to firms and by paying unemployment in-
surance. The simple agents are called workers and they look for jobs in firms to
get paid, for the earned money they will buy goods produced by those firms. The
core properties of the model are just like in the barter model—the private prices of
agents and also the private demand and supply conditions for the firms.
In a sense, the GenEqui model is as close to the barter model as possible. They
both evolve towards market clearing prices by minimising the public information
and using imitation as the learning mechanism. One would expect that they have
much in common and a good abstraction can be made for both of them. But when it
comes to the implementation, there is not much sharing between them. The agents
in the barter economy have almost nothing in common with the workers in GenEqui,
or even less with the firms. We used CCFinder again to see if there is any copy-paste
code between the two projects, but no; Gintis found that it is better to start from
scratch than to build on top of the barter economy.
The barter economy model was not easy to reproduce, but the complexity of
the GenEqui model is bigger by an order of magnitude, as is the number of details
hidden in uncommented code. All that leaves the GenEqui project out of scope for
this thesis project.
3.3 New implementation
At this point, we have developed some rough guidelines for the new implementation.
Firstly, it should not be much more general than the original barter economy but
rather more flexible—the user should be able to extend it without having to study
the whole source code. Secondly, to give some guarantees on how the program
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works, it is important to take encapsulation at its highest and make it difficult
for the user to accidentally change the behaviour of the model in undesired ways
and thus misinterpret the results. Thirdly, MASON will be used as the underlying
simulation platform; and last but not least, we set to fix the mismatches between
the code and the description of the model and take Gintis’ paper as the reference
rather than the implementation.
3.3.1 Adapting to MASON’s architecture
The architecture of the new implementation is, to a large extent, driven by MASON’s
architecture—a schedule of agents and a clear distinction between the simulated
model and the GUI. The central part of every model is the simulation state, a
class inherited from MASON’s SimState (see Fig. 3.3). This is where the model is
initially set up by creating and scheduling the agents. To be precise, anything that
implements the Steppable interface can be scheduled. The GUI layer that attaches
itself to the simulation state is optional, SimState and also our BarterEconomy are
unaware of it.
MASON classes
Console
simulation: GUIState
Schedule
time: double
step(state: SimState)
schedule(time: double; event: Steppable)
Steppable
step(state: SimState)
SimState
schedule: Schedule
random: MersenneTwisterFast
GUIState
state: SimState
BarterEconomy
traders: TradeAgent[]
BarterEconomyGUI
TradeAgent
Figure 3.3: The class structure for the new implementation using MASON
Once the model is set up, it is advanced by calling the step method in Schedule.
This method increases an internal time ticker of the schedule and invokes the indi-
vidual Steppable’s that were scheduled for this particular timestamp. If a GUI is
used to start the simulation, then it is GUIState that takes care of these top level
calls to Schedule, otherwise it is up to the user to write a loop for this purpose.
The described architecture matches well the Model-View-Controller (MVC) pat-
tern. SimState and its supporting classes represent the model part, whereas GUI-
State together with various charting and visualisation functionality constitutes the
view part. MASON’s Console class defines the way the user interface reacts to
user input and thus acts as a controller. It contains all the functionality for simula-
tion control (starting, stopping, pausing) and also an interface to modify the model
parameters.
3.3.2 Ensuring local correctness
Before comparing the global behaviour of our implementation to that of the reference
implementation, it is helpful to be sure that our program really does what we think
it does. If we can confirm our assumptions about the low-level behaviour of the
program and still get a different global behaviour, then the assumptions themselves
need to be revised.
The focus is on the TradeAgent class, as it defines and mutates the state of the
simulation model. To ensure its correctness, we establish some class invariants as
well as pre- and postconditions for the key methods. We implement these checks by
using the assert statement in Java. Another consideration was The Java Modelling
Language7, which uses Java annotation comments for specifying various checks, but
unfortunately the supporting tools do not handle Java versions above 1.4 yet.
TradeAgent
produceGood: int
produceAmount: double
barterStrategy: BarterStrategy
improStrategy: ImprovementStrategy
price: double[]
consume: double[]
demand: double[]
exchangeFor: double[]
inventory: double[]
score: double
Figure 3.4: Instance variables in the TradeAgent class
The state of an agent is defined by the instance variables shown in Fig. 3.4. The
produceGood field defines the good that a particular agent produces and produce-
7http://www.eecs.ucf.edu/~leavens/JML/
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Amount is the amount it can produce at a time. The type of produceGood is int,
which means that a good is represented just by an integer. Thus, the private prices
of an agent can be expressed as an array of doubles, where the array index also
denotes the good number. The same mapping between goods and array indices is
used for all the fields with double[] as the type. From this we know that the length
of every such array always equals to the number of goods in the model. We can
define it as a class invariant for the TradeAgent class.
However, breaking the described invariant would be a major bug and most likely
would crash the program. It is more desirable to detect errors that silently affect
the behaviour of the model. One such invariant that is broken in the original im-
plementation was described in 3.1.1. The amounts that an agent is willing to give
in exchange for any other good are pre-calculated and stored in the exchangeFor
array. As these amounts always reflect the price vector of the agent, the following
assertion should always hold for every good g:
assert Math.abs(exchangeFor[g] − price[g] * demand[g] / price[produceGood]) < 0.01;
Figure 3.5: Checking a class invariant with the assert statement
Another invariant is that the score of an agent can not be negative. The same
also holds for the values in consume[] (how much of each good an agent consumes),
price[], demand[], exchangeFor[] and inventory[].
All these invariants are established in the constructor of the TradeAgent class
and if any of the assertions on these invariants fails later on, there must be a pro-
gramming error.
Additionally, we use assertions to ensure that no resources are lost or created
during a trade as shown in Fig. 3.6; or to check that the trade conditions have not
been changed after both sides have adjusted the exchanged amounts to be compatible
with their inventory (the ratio of the amounts has to be the same).
Double before = null, after = null;
assert (before = responder.getInventory(produceGood) + inventory[produceGood]) != null;
. . . // trading between this and responder
assert (after = responder.getInventory(produceGood) + inventory[produceGood]) != null;
assert Math.abs(before − after) < 0.02;
Figure 3.6: Comparing the total amount of a traded good before and after the trade
By default, the assertions in Java are not enabled and thus have no performance
penalty at run-time.
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3.3.3 Serialisation
MASON supports checkpointing, that is, saving the simulation state to disk and
restoring it later on. This is particularly useful when the simulation runs take a
long time—one might want to fork the simulation at some point and continue with
different parameters for different branches from there on.
The checkpointing is built on the Java object serialisation API and concerns only
the model layer. Writing the simulation state to disk starts from the BarterEconomy
class, and every object referenced from there on must be made serialisable by im-
plementing the java.io.Serializable interface somewhere in its class hierarchy.
In fact, there is more to serialisation than just implementing the named inter-
face. One issue that Bloch [Blo08] points out, is that when a class implements
Serializable, its byte-stream encoding (or serialised form) becomes part of its
exported API. To make the serialised form of the simulation concise and com-
patible with the newer versions of the classes, we want to serialise the minimum
number of fields that lets us restore the global state of the simulation. For ex-
ample in the TradeAgent class, we can avoid serialising the myProxy field of type
TradeAgentProxy (by using the transient keyword). It is a restricted view on the
TradeAgent class (see 4.2), which is easy to reconstruct after reading the rest of the
object from a byte stream as shown in Fig. 3.7.
private transient TradeAgentProxy myProxy; // No need to serialise this
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream s) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
s.defaultReadObject();
myProxy = new TradeAgentProxy(this);
if (!checkInvariants()) {
throw new InvalidObjectException("TradeAgent invariants broken!");
}
}
Figure 3.7: Restoring an instance of TradeAgent class from its serialised form
We must also permit that the readObject method, which constructs the object
from a byte stream, becomes another public constructor for the class. Thus, we need
to ensure that the invariants of the class still hold after reading an object from a
byte stream (Fig. 3.7).
When it comes to serialising the user provided classes (the strategy classes, see
4.3), we decided to extend our interfaces with the Serializable interface rather
than letting the individual classes decide on implementing it. This guarantees the
default serialisation protocol for all the user-provided classes and the user does not
need to know about the serialisation framework.
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3.3.4 Thread safety
Not much effort has been put into making the classes thread-safe as the simulation
process is sequential. The only exception is the BarterParams class, which has to
handle concurrent reads and writes from the main thread and the Swing GUI thread.
The class is a container for all the model parameters and provides just the accessor
methods.
An easy way to synchronise the class is to make all the methods synchronized
and thus use the intrinsic lock of the BarterParams class. We can avoid acquiring
the lock when reading/writing int and boolean parameters as those operations are
atomic.
A more fine-grained (non)solution would have been to introduce a separate lock
for every parameter field, so that different parameters could be read and written
concurrently. But at some point we need to clone the whole object and thus also
need all the locks. Acquiring the locks one by one is a possible source for deadlocks.
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Chapter 4
Extensibility
4.1 Possible uses for the application
We are speculating that this application could be used by people who are studying or
are conducting research in economics rather than in computer science. As such, we
want to provide for easy and safe ways to extend the application by way of simple,
yet flexible interfaces.
Generalising over different market models could not be done in a way that would
allow for orthogonal extensions—at least not for those extensions we had in mind.
The more general the market model, the less behaviour is pre-defined and the more
is left to custom extensions. Those extensions then become dependent on each other.
For example, it is hard to describe the agent behaviour for accepting trades if we
do not even know what constitutes an agent and a trade. Depending on the other
extensions, it could be a work contract between a worker and a firm, but also the
bartering of two goods as in the barter economy.
This leads us to thinking of the “market rules” and “trader behaviour” just
within the barter economy. A user should be able to change the behaviour of the
agents, either for all or for some fraction so that agents with different behaviours
could cooperate in the same simulation. Gintis’ original formulation thus becomes
a special case that is implemented as the default behaviour.
4.2 Safety/correctness aspects of extensions
If we regard the whole simulation as a game and look at each user of the system
as a player, how can we ensure that no player can cheat? Cheating in this context
would mean that a player (for its agents) can gain information it is not supposed to
have or that it can affect any agents by other means than passing data back to the
class that called the strategy.
The market itself may need access to the agents that any strategy used in the
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agents should not have. We solve this problem by introducing a protective proxy
[GHJV95] for the TradeAgent. The purpose of the proxy is to provide a more
restrictive interface to the TradeAgent class. In particular, no mutators are acces-
sible and no references to the fields in the agent can be accessed. In this case, the
proxy is not expected to ever revoke the permissions of the accessing class. If the
TradeAgent class is extended, the proxy does not change automatically; thus the
strategies can not, accidentally or intentionally, break any rules that were in place
before the change. This could maybe be regarded as a special case of the Facet
pattern, where we have a fixed facet accessible for the agent strategies and one for
the market.
4.3 Extending agents on the individual level
The task of controlling that new behaviours are orthogonal to each other is simpli-
fied by not letting the TradeAgent class be sub-classed. By explicitly prohibiting
inheritance we can tightly control what extensions are allowed.
There could be two different goals when inheriting from some class;
“One can view inheritance as a private decision of the designer to “reuse”
code because it is useful to do so; it should be possible to easily change
such a decision. Alternatively, one can view inheritance as making a
public declaration that objects of the child class obey the semantics of
the parent class, so that the child class is merely specialising or refining
the parent class.” [Sny86]
The first goal is clearly not appropriate here; we do not expect the agent class
to be useful outside this project. The second goal could be relevant but if the class
is extended by inheritance we run into the “fragile base class problem” [MS97]. In
our application the problem would manifest itself as follows;
• If methods are overridden, there can be no guarantee that the child still acts
according to the market rules. To be able to guarantee that the agent plays
by the rules, it should no longer have [write] access to its own data. Another
solution to ensure that the agent abide by the market rules would be that
all transactions would have to be verified by some signature or checksum that
easily can be verified but not “forged” by the agent. This would be outside the
scope of this project and also slow down the simulation. Even if the child is
originally well behaved, later additions to the base class can render it unsafe.
4.3.1 Barter strategies
Axelrod discusses some aspects of adaptive vs. rational/optimising strategies in
[Axe03]. The trading behaviour in Gintis’ original model could be described as
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purely adaptive; the agents do not take history into account, nor do they try to
maximise their score by actively adjusting their price levels. By providing an inter-
face that lets the agent have access to slightly more information compared to the
original program, a new set of adaptive and rational behaviours could be created.
In particular, agents having different behaviours could co-exist in the same market.
The barter strategy interface and an implementation of Gintis’ original barter rule
can be found in Fig. 4.1.
public interface BarterStrategy {
public boolean acceptOffer(TradeAgentProxy me, int offersGood,
double offersAmount, double requestsAmount);
}
public class OriginalBarterStrategy implements BarterStrategy {
@Override
public boolean acceptOffer(TradeAgentProxy myself, int offersGood,
double offersAmount, double requestsAmount) {
return !(myself.getDemand(offeredGood) == 0 | |
myself.getExchangeFor(offeredGood) == 0 | |
myself.getInventory(myself.getProduceGood()) == 0 | |
myself.getPrice(offeredGood) * offeredAmount <
myself.getPrice(myself.getProduceGood()) * requestedAmount);
}
}
Figure 4.1: Barter strategy interface and our implementation of a function equivalent
to Gintis’ implementation.
4.3.2 Improvement strategies
In the original model, agents improve by being chosen as the worst performing in a
pair. The worse agent then copies the prices from the better performing agent and
possibly adjusts the prices up or down by a fixed factor. We have not generalised
this to let the user implement new ways for the market to handle selection.
The improvement strategy is implemented on the agent side, letting the agent
have full control over what to do when it is being selected for improvement. Fig. 4.2
shows the improvement strategy interface and our implementation of Gintis’ original
improvement rule (agent side).
The barter- and improvement strategies can be implemented in the same class
if the need for a strongly optimising agent should arise.
4.3.3 Replacement/mutation strategies
The reproduction-mutation phase as described in section 3.3 in [Gin06] (from here
on calledR3.3) is very dissimilar to the one used in the original Delphi program (from
here on called RD). There was an implementation (called GetNextGeneration in
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public interface ImprovementStrategy extends Observer {
public double[ ] improve(TradeAgentProxy betterAgent, TradeAgentProxy myself);
}
public class CopyAndMutateImprovementStrategy implements ImprovementStrategy {
private int numGoods;
private double mutationRate;
private double mutationDelta;
. . .
@Override
public double[ ] improve(TradeAgentProxy betterAgent, TradeAgentProxy myself) {
double[ ] newPrices = new double[numGoods];
double[ ] priceMutation = getMutationVector();
for (int good = 0; good < numGoods; good++) {
newPrices[good] = betterAgent.getPrice(good) * priceMutation[good];
}
return newPrices;
}
. . .
}
Figure 4.2: Improvement strategy interface and our implementation of a function
equivalent to Gintis’ CopyAndMutate.
barterp.pas, from here on called R3D) in the Delphi source of something that
looked somewhat congruent to R3.3, but it was not used.
When we enabled R3D in the original program, it failed to converge and got
stuck at some particular average price instead of oscillating around some (possibly
equilibrium) price. We do not know what the rationale for replacing the R3D algo-
rithm was, except that the implementation is broken. It sounds like a reasonable
algorithm that could have some real-life correspondence; since it takes the entire
population into account, weaker agents are more likely to copy the prices from the
strongest agents in a global sense. On the other hand, RD is conceptually simple
and also as asymptotically fast as could be possible. Copying will be linear time in
the number of goods, g. If k is the number of agents to replace, we can not expect
a better asymptotic complexity than O(gk).
The default behaviour of our Java program (J ) is to use the same algorithm as
is in Gintis’ program (G) by default. Fig. 4.3 shows the strategy interface and our
implementation (from here on called RDJ) of Gintis’ Delphi version of the repro-
duction/mutation phase.
We also provide an implementation that we feel is a reasonable interpretation
of R3.3 called OriginalReplacementStrategy (from here on R3J). R3J should be
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expected to be much slower than RDJ/RD, especially as replacement rates approach
0.5.
Not knowing how interestingR3.3 is
1 we have not provided a fast implementation
of it in R3J . It should be possible to make an implementation of R3.3 having
complexity in either O(gn) or O(gk log k), g being the number of goods, n being
the number of agents per good and k being the number of agents to replace. In
comparison, RDJ has complexity O(gk) and we guess that R3J has average time
complexity on the order of O(gn log n). In the interest of time, we have not made a
proper analysis of the complexity of our implementation of R3J . It should at least
almost surely2 terminate assuming a perfect stream of random numbers.
public interface ReplacementStrategy {
public void getNextGeneration(List<TradeAgent> producers, BarterParams params,
MersenneTwisterFast random);
}
public class DelphiReplacementStrategy implements ReplacementStrategy {
@Override
public void getNextGeneration(List<TradeAgent> producers, BarterParams params,
MersenneTwisterFast random) {
long replacements = Math.max(1, Math.round(producers.size() *
params.getReplacementRate()));
for (int i = 0; i < replacements; i++) {
int j = random.nextInt(producers.size());
int k = random.nextInt(producers.size());
if (producers.get(j).getScore() > producers.get(k).getScore()) {
producers.get(k).improve(producers.get(j));
} else {
producers.get(j).improve(producers.get(k));
}
}
}
}
Figure 4.3: Replacement/mutation strategy interface and our implementation of a
strategy (RDJ) equivalent to RD.
1After all, it was not used in Gintis’ original program
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost_surely
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Chapter 5
Scalability
In this chapter, we study the scalability of our program with regard to model pa-
rameters. In particular, it is interesting to see how increasing the number of goods
or agents influences the simulation performance. To support the results of time
measurements, we first analyse the asymptotic time complexity of our program.
5.1 Asymptotic time complexity
When we started the work on this project we were quite surprised by how slow the
simulation was even for relatively few agents and goods, such as the parameters
Gintis originally used.
By analysing the time complexity of the model as described in [Gin06] we can
see that we should not expect the simulation to ever be very fast due to cubic time
complexity in the number of goods used.
We do not try to analyse the complexity with regards to memory use, cache
behaviour, I/O, etc., but restrict ourselves to analysing the asymptotic worst time
complexity of each function used in the original model.
Note that the pseudo-code given is a slight simplification; we have for most
functions only included the parts that we need to facilitate time complexity analysis.
5.1.1 Definitions
Notation for execution time
T (function()) is the time function() takes to execute. O(T (function())) is the
asymptotic time complexity for the execution of function(). O(T (a.b−a.c)) is the
time complexity for executing lines a.b to a.c, inclusive.
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Assumptions about complexity of individual operations
We assume that all functions for generating random numbers take constant time.
Although this is not quite correct for randomInt(), we deem it sufficiently close
to constant to let us simplify the analysis (see C.2). Assignments, array element
read/writes, application of binary/unary arithmetic and logical operators, memory
allocation/calling an empty constructor, etc., are also assumed to be in O(1).
5.2 Analysis of the barter-algorithm
The complete algorithm is shown in Alg. 5. To make the analysis as simple as
possible, we show the complexity for the innermost functions and loops first, letting
us eventually calculate the complexity for the full program as the last step.
Algorithm 1 Barter initialization pseudo-code
Parameters: g : number of goods, n : number of agents per good
1: function init(g, n)
2: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
3: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
4: a← new agent.
5: ⊲ Set a’s type/production good to i. ⊳
6: aproduces ← i
7: for each k ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
8: ⊲ random() returns a random uniform value on [0, 1). ⊳
9: apricek ← random()
10: end for
11: Ai ← Ai ∪ {a} ⊲ Add a to Ai ⊳
12: end for
13: end for
14: return A
15: end function
5.2.1 Complexity of init
We start with the initialisation function, init(), as shown in Alg. 1. Init() is called
from main(), Alg. 5.
Lines 1.1 to 1.1 execute a constant time function and an assignment g times for
a complexity of O(g).
Lines 1.1 to 1.1 execute n times. The creation and initialisation of a new agent
(line 1.1) takes some constant plus O(g) time for initialising the prices. Thus the loop
1.1 to 1.1 takes time O(n)(O(g)+O(T (1.1−1.1))) = O(n)((O(g)+O(g))) ⊆ O(ng).
The outermost loop, lines 1.1 to 1.1, is executed g times giving final complexity
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O(T (1.1− 1.1))O(ng) ⊆ O(g)O(ng) ⊆ O(ng2) (5.1)
Algorithm 2 Barter improvement pseudo-code
Parameters: h : “well-performing” agent
1: function improve(h)
2: ⊲ Create new agent a having h’s attributes. ⊳
3: a← h
4: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
5: if random() < mutationRate then
6: if randomBoolean() then
7: apricei ← apricei∆m
8: else
9: apricei ← apricei∆
−1
m
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: return a
14: end function
5.2.2 Complexity of improve
Improve(), Alg. 2, is called from reproduceAndMutate(), Alg. 3.
The assignment in 2.3 is in O(g), copying all prices from h to a. Each step in
the loop 2.4 to 2.12 is in O(1), loop g times, for a complexity of O(g). The total
complexity of improve() is thus
O(g) +O(g) ⊆ O(g) (5.2)
5.2.3 Complexity of reproduceAndMutate
ReproduceAndMutate(), Alg. 3, is called from main(), Alg. 5.
Lines 3.8 to 3.12 are all constant time operations with the exception of the call
to improve(), being in O(g).
Assuming replacementRate ≤ 1, k on line 3.2 can be at most n. The first inner
loop body, 3.6–3.13, is executed k times, k ≤ n. All statements in the loop are
constant time except the call to improve(), giving the first inner loop a complexity
of O(k)O(g) ⊆ O(kg) ⊆ O(ng).
The second inner loop body, 3.14–3.16, is executed n times and in each step
calling a function in O(1) for a complexity of O(n).
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Algorithm 3 Barter reproduction & mutation pseudo-code. Note that this is not
equivalent to the Reproduction-Mutation phase described in section 3.3 of [Gin06].
This algorithm was taken from Gintis’ Delphi version.
Parameters: A : list of lists of agents, g : number of goods, n : number of agents
per good
1: function reproduceAndMutate(A, g, n)
2: k ← max(1, ⌊n× replacementRate⌋)
3: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
4: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
5: ⊲ randomInt(k) returns a random integer on {0, . . . , k − 1}. ⊳
6: a← randomInt(n) + 1
7: b← randomInt(n) + 1
8: if score(Ag,a) < score(Ag,b) then
9: Ag,a ← improve(Ag,b) ⊲ Copy/mutate from Ag,b’s prices. ⊳
10: else
11: Ag,b ← improve(Ag,a) ⊲ Copy/mutate from Ag,a’s prices. ⊳
12: end if
13: end for
14: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
15: Reset score for Ag,i
16: end for
17: end for
18: end function
The outer loop body, 3.3–3.17, executes g times. The loop body has complexity
O(ng) +O(n) for a total of
O(g)(O(ng) +O(ng)) ⊆ O(ng2) (5.3)
5.2.4 Complexity of runPeriod
RunPeriod(), Alg. 4, is called from main().
The loop body for 4.2–4.5 sets the inventory for each good, O(g), and then sets
the inventory of the production good, O(1). This is repeated ng times (the total
number of agents in the system) for a complexity of O(g)O(ng) ⊆ O(ng2).
Lines 4.19–4.23 are in O(1) except the two calls to consume(), each being in
O(g) for complexity 2O(g) ⊆ O(g). O(T (4.19 − 4.23)) is O(g) or O(1) depending
on whether bartering was successful or not. It could also be claimed that it is O(g)
but we need to put it this way for analysing the complexity of the enclosing loop.
The enclosing loop, 4.15–4.25, is executed at most m times. The loop could
terminate in two ways:
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Algorithm 4 Barter pseudo-code for running one period
Parameters: A : list of lists of agents, g : number of goods, n : number of agents
per good, m : maximum number of barter attempts
1: function runPeriod(A, g, n,m)
2: for each a ∈ A{1,...,g} do ⊲ For each producer of each good ⊳
3: Set the inventory of a to zero for each good.
4: Set the inventory of a’s production good to g.
5: end for
6: p← random permutation of {1, . . . , g}.
7: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
8: o← random permutation of {1, . . . , n}.
9: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
10: for each k ∈ {1, . . . , g} do
11: if k 6= i then ⊲ Barter if the current agent is not of type pk ⊳
12: barterSucceeded← false, t← 0
13: ⊲ The current agent is Api,oj . ⊳
14: repeat
15: ⊲ Choose a random agent to trade with. ⊳
16: r ← randomInt(n) + 1
17: ⊲ Let agent oj of type pi barter with agent r of type pk ⊳
18: barterSucceeded← tryBarter(Api,oj , Apk,r)
19: if barterSucceeded then
20: Exchange goods between Api,oj and Apk,r.
21: consume(Api,oj )
22: consume(Apk,r)
23: end if
24: t← t+ 1
25: until t ≥ m ∨ barterSucceeded
26: end if
27: end for
28: end for
29: end for
30: end function
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• The loop terminates with m failed attempts, having complexity O(m).
• The loop terminates since bartering succeeded. Calling consume() is in O(g).
Thus the worst case would be that the agent succeeds with bartering after m−1
attempts for complexity O(m− 1) +O(g) ⊆ O(m+ g).
The inner good-loop body, 4.12–4.25, executes g − 1 times due to the fact that
the agent does not trade with agents of the same type (line 4.11). Thus the loop
4.10–4.27 has complexity O(g)(O(m+ g)) ⊆ O(g(m+ g)).
The agent-loop body, 4.10–4.27, executes n times for a complexity ofO(n)O(g(m+
g)) ⊆ O(ng(m+ g)).
Creating a random permutation on {1, . . . , n} is in O(n). Thus the loop body
4.8–4.28 is in O(n) +O(ng(m+ g)) ⊆ O(ng(m+ g)).
The outer good-loop body, 4.8–4.28, is executed g times and the body has com-
plexity O(ng(m+ g)) for a total complexity of O(g)O(ng(m+ g)) ⊆ O(ng2(m+ g)).
Final complexity of runPeriod() is
O(T (4.2− 4.5) +O(T (4.6)) +O(T (4.7− 4.29)) ⊆
O(ng2) +O(g) +O(ng2(m+ g)) ⊆ O(ng2(m+ g)) (5.4)
Algorithm 5 Barter main program pseudo-code
Parameters: g : number of goods, n : number of agents per good, m : maximum
number of barter attempts, r : periods between reproduction/mutation, p :
number of periods to run
1: function main(g, n,m, r)
2: A← init(g, n)
3: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , p} do
4: runPeriod(A, g, n,m)
5: if i ≡ 0 (mod r) then
6: reproduceAndMutate(A, g, n)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end function
5.2.5 Complexity of main
Main() is the outermost level of the algorithm, shown in Alg. 5.
Initialisation is in O(ng2), running the program for one period is in O(ng2(m+
g)). Reproduction/mutation is in O(ng2), executing every rth period. Assuming
the worst case for r, r = 1, reproduceAndMutate() will be called every period
making O(r) ⊆ O(1). The complexity for main() is
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
agents 100 reproduce period 10
replacement rate 0.05 mutation rate 0.1
∆mutation 0.95 max tries 5
goods 6 consume 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Table 5.1: Default parameters for timing tests of J and G
O(T (init())) +O(p)O(T (runPeriod())) +
O(p)O(T (reproduceAndMutate()) ⊆
O(ng2) +O(png2(m+ g)) +O(png2) ⊆
O(ng2(1 + p(m+ g + 1))) ⊆
O(png2(m+ g)) (5.5)
5.3 Testing the performance of different parameter sets
The asymptotic worst case behaviour may not be a good description of the actual
running time. In Fig. 5.1 we show time measurements for Gintis’ original parameter
set, Table 5.1, varied over number of goods. As we can see by fitting the polynomial
y = ax3 + bx2 + cx + d, x being the number of goods and y being time taken in
seconds, a is typically much smaller than b. This observation implies that the actual
running time is closer to cng2. With n being the number of agents per good and
g being the number of goods, for g ≥ 13, the polynomial f(n, g) = 100n(0.005g3 +
0.077g2−0.17x+2.4) gave us the correct time within {−13,+6} percent. The cubic
coefficient (0.005) shows to be more than an order of magnitude smaller than the
square coefficient (0.077) in practise.
5.3.1 Test environment
The timing tests were run on a dual dual core 2 GHz AMD Opteron 270 machine
with 4 GB of RAM. We used the Java 1.6.0 07 JVM/JRE with the “-server”
option for all tests. For some of the tests the program used slightly more than 100%
CPU, implying that it for some duration was running on more than one core. The
measured times are CPU-seconds, not real time.
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5.4 Possible gains from concurrency
The loop 4.9–4.28 of runPeriod() should be possible to parallelise completely.
The dependencies are strictly one way, i.e. exactly one type of producer is acting as
offerers and exactly one type is acting as responder. The responders should simply
block if they are already within the barter code block. This is easily facilitated by
Java’s synchronized mechanism.
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Figure 5.1: Time taken in seconds for running our program for 1000 periods, using
the default parameters and varying the number of goods.
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Chapter 6
Convergence
Here we examine how “close” we can say that our program is compared to Gintis’
original implementation. One of the bigger problems is to decide on a notion of
similarity for pseudo-random processes.
6.1 Global testing
“. . . program testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of
bugs, but is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence.” [Dij72]
We need to gather evidence that Gintis’ Delphi program, G, and our Java ver-
sion, J , behave the same on a global scale. For any re-implementation where the
architecture or structure has been changed, there will be other mechanisms than
unit tests only needed.
One problem with writing a program for simulation is that one typically does
not know what the results are expected to be. In our case, the expected output
should be similar to what G is producing.
In [Axe03] Axelrod gives three levels of replication:
1. “Numerical identity” in which the results are reproduced precisely.
2. “Distributional equivalence” in which the results can not be distinguished sta-
tistically.
3. “Relational equivalence” in which the qualitative relationships among the vari-
ables are reproduced.
Since we could not (with a reasonable amount of work) completely control each
and every mechanism used in the platforms for the two implementations, such as how
floating point arithmetic is performed, we did not strive for “numerical identity” but
only for “distributional equivalence”. Hence we say that the programs are similar
when they are distributionally equivalent.
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This in turn begs the question what statistics to use to distinguish data sets;
what statistics capture the essential features of the model? Not knowing what the
essential features are, we will have to construct tests that make as few assumptions
about relevant features as possible.
6.2 Random number generation
Since many of the decisions taken in Gintis’ model are randomised, we wanted
to make sure that any particular structure1 of the Delphi pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG) did not affect the convergence properties of the simulations in
ways that should not be expected from a proper random sequence. We call the
original Delphi program, using Delphi’s built-in PRNG “Go”.
See Appendix C for some analysis and tests of the Delphi PRNG as well as a
description of the generator we replaced it with in Delphi. We call the Delphi version
with the original PRNG replaced by the KISS99 PRNG “Gk”.
With the number of runs and tests we have done with Go and Gk, we can not
conclusively say that the output of Go differs from Gk in any significant way. We will
still use the altered program, Gk, as our reference.
MASON uses the Mersenne Twister MT19937 [MN98], a well known good gen-
erator with few known flaws [LS07] and a very long period (> 106001).
6.3 Our definition of similarity for price convergence
Defining a necessary condition for passing the test is easy; when partitioning the
data from different runs from the reference process, each partition element should be
regarded as a “pass” with regards to the other element. Output data from another
process which we want to compare should (for some statistic) behave to the reference
data as the reference data does to itself. This is our definition of “distributional
equivalence”.
Since we can not define what is considered sufficient, we will regard a process
as a “pass” if it just satisfies the necessary condition of producing data that is no
more different to the reference than the reference is to itself.
6.3.1 Similarity statistics
What data should be similar?
For some process, we sample average good prices relative to a reference good at
uniformly distributed times t. We denote one such list of prices as PX,s,S,g, X being
1For some types of random number generators, in particular linear congruential generators, some
tuples of short lengths such as 2, 3 or 4 occur with much too non-uniform frequencies. See [Mar68]
and [MZ93].
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Figure 6.1: Time series and averages for 3 time slices of a good in a test run.
the name of the program, s being the random number generator seed, S being the
starting conditions (parameter set excluding the seed) for the run and g being the
index for the good. For our evaluation/description, we only use every 200th sample
and run each process for at least as many periods as to expect convergence for at
least one good.
Assuming we have some reference data PR,s...,S,g for fixed S but for a number of
distinct s, we can compare sets of runs, PR,sI ,S,g to PR,sJ ,S,g, I ∩J ≡ ∅, |I| ≈ |J | and
see how similar we should expect them to be.
Unfortunately, comparing the reference to itself is not feasible since we typically
have a limited set of reference data. We have from testing seen that the way we
partition the reference greatly influences the test results. Furthermore, to ensure
that the samples really are independent, we have to make sure that we only take
one sample from each run r, PR,r,S,g; in practice, we will not be able to compare the
entire time series for one good but will have to set for a few reference points. We
create these reference points by segmenting a time series into a few slices of equal
length and then compute the averages, see Fig. 6.1.
Testing for distribution equality
For the subsequent statistical tests we have used MATLAB2. We need to test the
hypothesis that the distribution of prices at some period and for some good are the
same. We start by testing if the populations are normal by way of the Lilliefors
test3, implemented in MATLAB as lillietest. For the samples we have taken,
the Lilliefors test rejects the null-hypothesis, that the population is normal, at the
99.9% level.
2See http://www.mathworks.com/
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lilliefors_test
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Since we do not think the populations are normal, we need to use a non-
parametric test; a test for similarity that does not have any a priori knowledge
with regards to the distribution.
One such test that can be used for continuous populations is the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (KS-test). The one-sample KS-test gives a probability that a sample
comes from a statistical distribution with known parameters (given as a CDF). Since
we do not know what distribution to expect (and thus even less so, the parameters),
we will use the two-sample KS-test.
The two-sample KS-test takes two samples, computes their empirical [cumula-
tive] distribution functions (ECDFs) and based on the maximum distance between
the two “functions”, gives a probability that they are sampled from the same distri-
bution. A practical description of the two-sample KS-test can be found in [She00].
See Fig. 6.2 for some examples of ECDFs and corresponding KS-test probabilities.
The two-sample KS-test is implemented as kstest2 in MATLAB.
For each time-slice st we should expect two samples from the population of runs
for a fixed good to have the same distribution for the two programs. For each
parameter set, we apply Algorithm 6. If all goods fail the KS-test at the 10−5 level,
we reject the null-hypothesis (same CDF) and regard the programs as different.
Choice of H0
It is not clear that there is one uniquely perceived (dis)similarity between two pro-
grams and thus not clear that one particular null-hypothesis is superior to another.
The choice of distributional equivalence (in the KS-test sense) may be the most
stringent but a weaker hypothesis might also do.
Two weaker null-hypotheses that could be of interest is “same median” and
“same mean”:
• H0 ⇐⇒ populations have same median. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is
a robust test (insensitive to outliers) giving a probability estimate that two
populations have the same median.
• H0 ⇐⇒ populations have same mean. An interval estimate of the difference
of means, µ1 − µ2, indicates that the means are the same when the interval
contains zero.
To illustrate the difference in sensitivity to differences in distributions, we have
created Fig. 6.3 and Table 6.1. Each table entry describes the probability that
the null-hypothesis holds for the KS-test (same distribution) and the rank-sum test
(same median).
As can be seen in Table 6.1, rows 2a, 2b, columns 1a, 1b, the rank-sum test
is more sensitive than the KS-test to differences in medians. The KS-test is more
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Figure 6.2: Empirical CDFs and KS-test probabilities.
sensitive to differences of variance and distribution shape as can be seen when com-
paring 1b to 3b or, more spectacularly, 3b to 4b. The slight difference between the
tests when comparing 4a to 4b stems from the fact that even though the means and
variances are the same for these populations, the medians are not; median for 4a is
-0.116 and median for 4b is -0.076.
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Algorithm 6 Similarity test for time series
Parameters: xref : reference time series, xcmp : time series to compare, s : time
slices, t : test repetitions
Require: rows(xref ) = rows(xcmp)
Require: s ≤ min(cols(x1), cols(x2)).
⊲ The time series data are three-dimensional arrays indexed as si,j,k where i is
the good index, j is the time index and k is the test run index. ⊳
1: function multiTimeSeriesTest(xref , xcmp, s, t)
2: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} do
⊲ Partition each set of test data into s partition elements of ≈ equal size. Each
partition is over the test runs meaning that each partition element will contain
all good prices over time from some subset of test runs. ⊳
3: rref,i ← a random partition of runs from xref .
4: rcmp,i ← a random partition of runs from xcmp.
⊲ Now rref,i,j,k will be the price of good i at time j for test run k (out of
testruns(rref )/s). ⊳
5: end for
6: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , goods} do
7: for each k ∈ {1, . . . , s} do
8: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} do
9: for each l ∈ {1, . . . , testruns(rref,i)} do
⊲ Use disjoint subsets of p (partition elements) for each time slice to ensure that
the test of time slice sx will not influence the test of slice sx+1. ⊳
10: mref,i,l ← mean of good j for time slice k for element l of rref,i.
11: end for
12: for each l ∈ {1, . . . , testruns(rcmp,i)} do
13: mcmp,i,l ← mean of good j for slice k for element l of rcmp,i.
14: end for
⊲ Compute the KS-probability that the samples mref and mcmp come from the
same distribution. ⊳
15: pi ← KSTest2(mref ,mcmp)
16: end for
⊲ Let score for good j at slice k be the median KS-probability of the t tests. ⊳
17: Pj,k ← median(p)
18: end for
19: end for
20: return P
21: end function
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Figure 6.3: Empirical CDFs for different sized samples and parameters.
Test 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a
1b
KS 1.00000 — — — — — —
rank-sum 1.00000 — — — — — —
2a
KS 0.98517 0.54975 — — — — —
rank-sum 0.32464 0.13000 — — — — —
2b
KS 0.54975 0.00081 1.00000 — — — —
rank-sum 0.13000 < 10−6 1.00000 — — — —
3a
KS 0.98517 0.64977 0.73584 0.25911 — — —
rank-sum 1.00000 1.00000 0.59936 0.35197 — — —
3b
KS 0.69378 0.00748 0.29082 < 10−6 1.00000 — —
rank-sum 1.00000 1.00000 0.32634 0.00246 1.00000 — —
4a
KS 1.00000 0.99998 0.73584 0.34630 0.73584 0.49799 —
rank-sum 0.94764 0.89708 0.26429 0.10187 1.00000 0.97370 —
4b
KS 1.00000 0.99961 0.41489 0.00006 0.56488 0.00259 1.00000
rank-sum 0.92927 0.73164 0.10619 < 10−7 0.98988 0.93210 0.97370
Table 6.1: Comparing populations with the KS-test and the rank-sum test.
6.3.2 Actual testing procedure
Any statistical testing of a system as complex as the barter model will at best be
superficial; the complete parameter space is immensely large. By choosing a default
parameter set (Table 6.2) and vary one parameter at a time we yet hope to get a
representative image of the programs’ behaviours.
For each parameter set we have chosen, Gk and J has been run at least 60 times
each for a number of periods at which we think they have converged for most goods.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
agents 100 reproduce period 10
replacement rate 0.5 mutation rate 0.4
∆mutation 0.995 max tries 5
goods 3 consume 1, 2, 3
Table 6.2: Default parameters for convergence tests of J and Gk. If more than
three goods are used, the consumption rate of good g equals the good index. E.g.
consume for 5 goods would be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Test results
In Table 6.3 we show the results of our tests. The “Parameter” column lists what
parameters, if any, were changed compared to the default parameters in Table 6.2.
KSA is the mean KS-probability for the time slices we sample, KSt is the median
KS-probability for slice t of 3 over 50 attempts.
We say that J passes the test for a parameter set if KSA ≥ 0.05 (marked
with a 3) and does not have “catastrophic failures” for both goods. We call a
KS-probability less than 0.001 a catastrophic failure and mark it with a 7. If any
time-segment has a catastrophic failure, the convergence for that good is marked as
a fail. If the test fails for all goods, either by having at least one catastrophic failure
for all goods or all KSA being less than 0.05, we mark the result as a A.
The u1 − u2 column gives a 99% confidence interval for the mean difference
between the mean of the last 10% of the periods for a good. If the means of the
populations really are the same, the interval should contain zero.
|Gk| and |J | denote how many runs of Gk and J were used for the test. With 3
time slices, the number of samples for each KS-test is 13{|Gk|, |J |}.
A brief interpretation of Table 6.3
For most parameter sets we have chosen, J passes the KS-test as well as either
having a mean difference interval that contains zero or being very close (±0.2) to
containing zero.
Unfortunately, there are four parameter sets that do fail the KS-test.
For one of the sets, the “Default”, the difference in means is very small ([+0.08,
+0.34], [+0.53, +0.82]). We think that the convergence points for Gk and J might
be the same. A few symmetric outliers will make the KS-test fail (higher variance)
and a few assymmetric outliers will make the rank-sum test fail (see Figure D.5.l),
even if the means really are the same.
For the three other bad cases, ∆mutation = 0.975, repr.Period = 400 and
repl.Rate = 0.75, we can not tell where the discrepancies come from. In the in-
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terest of time, we at some point had to give up looking for the reason(s) to be able
to finish the report.
One of the points in the programs we have given extra attention to is the permu-
tation generation (see C.1.2) but we are confident that the permutation generattion
code in both programs behave identically in a statistical sense.
One possibility that we have not examined thoroughly is round-off errors. Even
though we have made sure that the same precision floating point arithmetic is used
in Gk and J , exceptional events such as division by zero or handling of NaN may
be handled differently. Making a deeper study of the differences (or similarities)
between Java 6 and Delphi 7 with regards to floating of arithmetic seems like a
daunting task.
6.4 Level of replication
By observing Table 6.3 we can see that we for some parameter sets fall short of
our goal to reach “distributional equivalence”. Based on Table 6.3 and the plots
in Appendix D, we can however say that we do reach “relational equivalence”; if
the parameter changes did not have the same general effects in both programs, we
would see µ1 − µ2 interval estimates that were off by 10% or more.
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Parameter G KSµ KS1 KS2 KS3 µ1 − µ2 Figures |Gk| |J | Result
10 agents
1 0.433 0.610 0.457 0.233 [−1.14,+0.33]
D.2 a–d 60 119 3
2 0.480 0.610 0.457 0.372 [+0.27,+0.51] 3
1000 agents
1 0.267 0.128 0.129 0.544 [−0.33,+0.58]
D.2 e–h 96 130 3
2 0.233 0.513 0.183 0.004 [−0.00,+0.41] 3
Default
1 0.347 0.502 0.540 7 [+0.08,+0.34] D.5 l 100 130 A2 0.203 0.505 0.103 7 [+0.53,+0.82]
maxTries = 300
1 0.599 0.529 0.719 0.547 [−3.92,+3.20]
D.5 k 60 129 3
2 0.595 0.548 0.704 0.533 [−0.73,−0.05] 3
maxTries = 300
1 0.467 0.278 0.654 0.468 [−0.31,+3.51]
D.5 j 60 114
3
2 0.592 0.620 0.687 0.468 [−0.07,+0.80] 3
3 0.466 0.679 0.389 0.331 [+0.11,+0.80] 3
maxTries = 300
1 0.588 0.689 0.466 0.608 [−4.52,+5.47]
D.1 e–h 60 128
3
2 0.378 0.350 0.584 0.201 [−2.72,−1.69] 3
3 0.543 0.644 0.544 0.441 [−0.96,+1.08] 3
4 0.229 0.523 0.129 0.035 [−2.48,−0.37] 3
maxTries = 300
1 0.440 0.457 0.327 0.535 [−7.69,+11.5]
D.1 a–d 60 119
3
2 0.523 0.457 0.457 0.656 [+0.33,+3.20] 3
3 0.480 0.457 0.457 0.527 [−0.22,+1.44] 3
4 0.370 0.148 0.392 0.570 [−2.15,+0.92] 3
5 0.491 0.457 0.457 0.558 [−2.30,+1.65] 3
6 0.273 0.327 0.121 0.370 [−0.17,+5.38] 3
∆mut. = 0.75
1 0.348 0.362 0.369 0.313 [−1.77,+5.15]
D.3 a–d 60 114 3
2 0.637 0.604 0.654 0.654 [−3.01,+4.25] 3
∆mut. = 0.975
1 0.114 0.342 7 7 [+1.67,+2.36] D.5 g 100 129 A2 0.088 0.264 7 7 [+1.86,+2.69]
∆mut. = 0.9975
1 0.437 0.584 0.648 0.080 [−4.55,−1.19]
D.3 e–h 60 129 3
2 0.367 0.547 0.551 0.002 [+0.38,+0.79] 3
mut.Rate = 0.01
1 0.508 0.610 0.457 0.457 [−6.01,+7.20]
D.5 a 60 120 3
2 0.559 0.610 0.457 0.610 [−1.76,−1.16] 3
mut.Rate = 0.1
1 0.598 0.654 0.563 0.579 [−5.71,+9.65]
D.5 b 60 114 3
2 0.511 0.470 0.375 0.687 [−0.04,+0.22] 3
mut.Rate = 1
1 0.448 0.537 0.622 0.185 [+0.43,+0.78]
D.5 c 60 130 3
2 0.290 0.487 0.380 0.004 [+0.80,+1.21] 3
maxTries = 3
1 0.678 0.704 0.777 0.554 [−8.32,+2.69]
D.4 a–d 60 115 3
2 0.339 0.483 0.403 0.132 [+0.25,+0.38] 3
maxTries = 30
1 0.290 0.250 0.332 0.289 [+0.04,+0.23]
D.4 e–h 60 117 3
2 0.192 0.511 0.062 0.001 [+0.27,+0.50] 3
repr.Period = 100
1 0.578 0.671 0.663 0.401 [−2.00,+1.69]
D.5 h 60 130 3
2 0.517 0.626 0.487 0.440 [+0.24,+0.55] 3
repr.Period = 400
1 0.318 0.511 0.442 7 [−0.78,−0.15] D.5 i 95 130 A2 0.123 0.296 0.074 7 [+0.41,+1.37]
repl.Rate = 0.01
1 0.434 0.295 0.506 0.502 [−12.8,+7.48]
D.5 d 60 123 3
2 0.658 0.644 0.675 0.656 [−0.32,−0.01] 3
repl.Rate = 0.1
1 0.488 0.399 0.527 0.539 [−4.06,+7.35]
D.5 e 60 118 3
2 0.459 0.635 0.515 0.227 [+0.36,+1.07] 3
repl.Rate = 0.75
1 0.161 0.403 0.079 7 [+0.39,+0.61] D.5 f 100 130 A2 0.182 0.532 0.014 7 [+0.57,+0.87]
Table 6.3: KS-tests and mean difference intervals comparing Gk to J . The “Param-
eter” column lists what parameters, if any, were changed compared to the default
parameters in Table 6.2.
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Chapter 7
Further work
Throughout the thesis work, we have been prioritising various features of the pro-
gram to fit in the time limit. In this chapter, we point out the features that were
left out, but might be useful further developments.
7.1 Parallelisation
The asymptotic time complexity of the model proved to be quite bad. To speed up
the simulation, it could help to perform certain simulation steps concurrently. We
identified the parts of the program that could benefit from parallelisation in 5.4.
7.2 Different ways of outputting data
To analyse the dynamics of a simulation run in other ways than just looking at
different charts, it is desirable to have the data outputting as an extension point.
The user can then direct and format the output in a custom way.
7.3 Dynamically loadable extensions
The way users can experiment with their own strategies is to write a new Java main
class and inject custom strategies programmatically as described in Appendix B. It
would be more convenient to load the strategy classes through the GUI.
7.4 Visualisation of different strategies
The visualisation of the agents should reflect the differences in used strategies. For
example, if a group of agents uses a different bartering strategy, one should be able
to identify these agents without clicking and inspecting each agent individually.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
We have developed an extensible and portable simulation tool for barter economics,
with the focus on replicating Gintis’ original barter economy model. We have shown
the convergence between his proof of concept implementation and our program,
although the task proved to be much more challenging than we anticipated. There
are two sides to convergence—making the models match in the first place, but at the
same time, convincing ourselves that they really do match, or the opposite if they
do not. Neither of these problems is trivial for the agent-based models involving
randomness.
It is easy to overlook seemingly insignificant implementation details. Examples
include the random number generation method, rounding of the floating-point values
or the order of simulated events. These details are hard to notice, but they are
important contributors to the global model behaviour.
Once we have a model to compare to the original, it becomes necessary to for-
mulate what it means for the two programs to converge. The difficulty here lies in
defining a strong enough non-parametric statistic to say that we can not tell the
original apart from the remake. At the same time, the statistic should match the
essence of what is relevant in the program.
The discrepancies between the description and the original implementation of
the barter economy confirm the importance of replication. Although we were able
to reproduce the main property of the model, the emergence of equilibrium prices,
we also found programming errors that affect the way this property is reached.
Besides the efforts in replicating Gintis’ work, we have taken the model one step
further by providing means for visualising individual agents and extending the model
with different agent or market behaviours. Those additions improve the intuitive
understanding of the model and make it possible to study the emergent properties
of heterogeneous agent behaviours. MASON proved to be a suitable platform for
these purposes—it does not place restrictions on the types of models that can be
simulated, and provides easy means for creating a GUI and visualising agents.
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If we were to do a similar project over, we would first try to achieve the numer-
ical identity to the reference program. Then change the design step by step while
observing that the numerical identity is preserved. This approach could save us from
statistically testing for convergence.
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Appendix A
User documentation
A.1 Installation instructions
Requirements: Java Runtime Environment version 6.
The program can be obtained from http://www.evensen.org/barter. To unpack
(assuming a UNIX-like system):
tar xvf barterEconomy.tar.gz
This will create a barterEconomy directory with all the required libraries in it.
Now the program can be run by:
java -jar barterEconomy/barterEconomy.jar
A.2 Using the program
A.2.1 The About tab
When the program is first started, the About tab is displayed in the MASON
console. It contains the description of the simulation model (Fig. A.1).
A.2.2 The Model and Displays tabs
Before starting a simulation run, it is possible to change the model parameters in
the Model tab or activate/deactivate various displays in the Displays tab (Fig.
A.2). To change the number of goods, the consume array has to be changed in the
Model tab.
64
Figure A.1: The About tab with the model description in the MASON console
Figure A.2: The Model and Displays tab
A.2.3 The Average Score chart
Under the Displays tab, it is possible to activate four different charts. The Av-
erage Score chart displays time series for the average scores of agents grouped
by their production good, but also the total average score among all agents. In a
6-good economy, there will be 7 series as shown in Fig. A.3.
A.2.4 The Average Price chart
The Average Price chart displays time series for the average prices of the goods
relative to the equilibrium prices. As one good is taken as the price unit, its price
will always be constant (y = 0) in the chart. Thus, in a 6-good economy, we get 5
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Figure A.3: The Average Score chart
prices that vary over time (Fig. A.4).
Figure A.4: The Average Price chart
A.2.5 The Producer Shares chart
The Producer Shares chart is interesting if the varySupply option is turned
on under the Model tab. It shows the share that the producers of a particular
good have. If there is an equal number of producers for each good it just displays
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a number of constant series equal to the number of goods in the model. Fig. A.5
shows what happens when varySupply is turned on mid-run.
Figure A.5: The Producer Shares chart
A.2.6 The Standard Deviation chart
The Standard Deviation chart displays three different standard deviation series:
consumer price, producer price, and mean price (Fig. A.6). All these are calculated
for one good only, which can be specified in the Model tab with the stdDevGood
parameter. The standard deviation of consumer price considers the prices from all
the agents except the producers of the good. The standard deviation of producer
price takes into account only the prices from the producers themselves. Finally, the
standard deviation of mean price considers the mean prices of the good for last 100
periods.
A.2.7 Visualising the agents
To get a better understanding of the economy at the agent level, the Agent Vi-
sualisation can be activated under the Displays tab. This brings up a display
similar to the one in Fig. A.7. Any active display will slow down the simulation
significantly, but this one is the worst (with respect to performance) and should not
be enabled if simulation speed is important. Since there typically is no need to see
what happens in each round, setting the Skip field in the Agent Visualisation
to a value of about 100, lessens the impact the display has on the overall speed.
In this visualisation, each agent is portrayed as a circle. This circle in turn is
split up to provide various kinds of information about the agent. The innermost
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Figure A.6: The Standard Deviation chart
Figure A.7: Visualised agents
circle reflects the production good of the agent. The next layer shows the score—
the darker it is, the higher the score for the agent (see Fig. A.8). The outermost pie
chart shows the price ideas of the agent (larger share means higher price for that
good).
A.2.8 Inspecting an agent
To get even more detailed information about an individual agent, one has to first
select it by double-clicking it. This marks the agent and opens up the Inspectors
tab in the MASON console as shown in Fig. A.9.
Various fields from the agent class are shown in the Inspectors tab, and by
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Figure A.8: A low scoring agent (on the left) vs. a high scoring agent
Figure A.9: Selecting an agent for inspection
clicking on the magnifying class it is possible to see even further details about com-
posite types—for example the price array (see Fig. A.10), updated in real time.
Figure A.10: Inspecting the prices of an individual agent
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Appendix B
Developer documentation
The goal of this Appendix is to instruct the user in extending the model.
B.1 The strategy interfaces
The first step in extending the model is to write an implementation of one of the three
strategy interfaces. All three of those interfaces (BarterStrategy, Improvement-
Strategy and ReplacementStrategy) are in the barter package and contain one
method each as shown in Fig. B.1.
public interface BarterStrategy {
public boolean acceptOffer(TradeAgentProxy me, int offersGood,
double offersAmount, double requestsAmount);
}
public interface ImprovementStrategy {
public double[ ] improve(TradeAgentProxy betterAgent, TradeAgentProxy myself);
}
public interface ReplacementStrategy {
public void getNextGeneration(List<TradeAgent> producers, BarterParams params,
MersenneTwisterFast random);
}
Figure B.1: Interface methods of the strategies.
A correct implementation of the acceptOffer method in BarterStrategy just
returns a boolean value, indicating whether the agent accepts the offer specified by
input parameters.
The improve method in ImprovementStrategy is expected to return an im-
proved price vector based on the information about two agents: itself and a better
scoring agent. The length of the improved price vector should be the same as it is
for the two agents.
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The getNextGenerationmethod in ReplacementStrategy is a bit different as it
expects the user to pick pairs of agents from the producers list and call the improve
method on them as follows:
producers.get(i).improve(producers.get(j), params, random);
Figure B.2: Telling the i-th agent to improve its prices based on j-th agent.
B.2 Running the model with custom strategies
Once the strategy implementations are complete, they can be put in use by creating
a new main class as shown in Fig. B.3.
1 import barter.BarterEconomy;
2 import barter.BarterParams;
3 import barter.CopyAndMutateImprovementStrategy;
4 import barter.DelphiReplacementStrategy;
5 import barter.GenerousBarterStrategy;
6 import barter.OriginalBarterStrategy;
7 import barter.display.BarterEconomyGUI;
8
9 public class Main {
10 public static void main(String[ ] args) {
11 BarterEconomy eco = new BarterEconomy();
12 eco.setParams(new BarterParams());
13
14 eco.addBarterStrategy(OriginalBarterStrategy.class, 0.5);
15 eco.addBarterStrategy(GenerousBarterStrategy.class, 0.5);
16
17 eco.setImprovementStrategy(CopyAndMutateImprovementStrategy.class);
18 eco.setReplacementStrategy(DelphiReplacementStrategy.class);
19
20 BarterEconomyGUI gui = new BarterEconomyGUI(eco);
21 gui.create();
22 }
23 }
Figure B.3: Initialising the model with custom strategies.
The code between lines 12-18 is optional, default values exist for these fields
in the BarterEconomy class. Using a custom ImprovementStrategy or Replace-
mentStrategy is as easy as specifying the new class for the economy (lines 17 and
18).
Initialising the model with custom barter strategies is a bit trickier. To be able to
initialise agents with different barter strategies, there is an additional parameter for
the addBarterStrategy method which determines the shares of different strategies.
When the simulation is started, those shares are summed up and the number of
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agents using a particular strategy is determined based on its share. In the above
example, half of the agents use OriginalBarterStrategy and the other half uses
GenerousBarterStrategy.
Finally, the GUI is brought up with the last two lines (20 and 21).
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Appendix C
Delphi pseudo-random number
generation
C.1 Flaws in the original Delphi V7 generator
Delphi V7 uses the most significant bits from the linear congruential generator
(LCG)1 xi = axi−1 + 1 mod 2
32, a = 134775813. When clocking the generator
for a number [0, q), the state is updated and the output is ⌊ qxi
232
⌋.
Our biggest concern with the Delphi PRNG is that the period is very short;
232. Within one single simulation run it would be possible to exhaust the period.
A run of the barter model uses at least periods× agentsPerGood× goods2 random
numbers, assuming every agent is successful in its first barter attempt. Another
problem is that different runs, using different seeds, would use substreams that are
not disjoint [LSCK02] with high probability.
C.1.1 Testing the generator
One comprehensive test suite for testing (pseudo) random number generators is
L’Ecuyer and Simard’s “TestU01”, [LS07]. In the terminology of Marsaglia (and
later L’Ecuyer), such a test suite is named a “battery”.
To assess how closely the Delphi PRNG models a random stream of numbers,
we run the batteries “SmallCrush” and “Crush” on various output combinations of
the Delphi PRNG.
Since many tests in the TestU01 batteries use 32 bit numbers, we run the tests
not only with the complete 32 bit outputs from the Delphi PRNG but also with
outputs that are concatenations of several smaller words. In the original application,
most calls to the PRNG are with small multipliers; the largest multiplier used is the
number of agents per group. Table C.1 shows the concatenations we used.
1See [Knu97] for a comprehensive treatment of linear congruential generators.
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By running the “TestU01” [LS07] test suite, we have found that the Delphi gen-
erator fails on most tests as can be seen in Tables C.3, C.4 and C.5. A failure consists
of a goodness-of-fit that is either too far or too close to the expected distribution.
Table C.2 contains a legend for the symbols used in the tests. The most spectacular
failures are the ones containing an ε; the chance of a stream generating these by
chance should be less than 10−300.
For all tests conducted with TestU01, version 1.2.1 was used.
C.1.2 Practical significance of poor properties of the Delphi PRNG
Whether the poor test scores from TestU01 is a practical rather than theoretical
issue for the original simulation we do not know. One of the algorithms that relies
heavily on randomization is the permutation generation for good order and agent
order. We have constructed two simple tests that are necessary (but not sufficient)
to pass to determine whether permutations are at least identically distributed (i.d.),
if not independently identically distributed (i.i.d).
Permutation index test
Any permutation of n unique elements can be indexed by an integer on [0, n!). We
call this a permutation index. We generate a sequence of k permutations, take their
permutation indices and construct a histogram from them. Assuming they are i.i.d.,
the histogram counts should be Poisson-distributed with λ = k
n! . We then compute
a goodness-of-fit score (by way of the one-sample KS-test) to get the probability p
that the histogram really is Poisson-distributed.
When conducting tests for n = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, we did not find any indication
that the histograms are not Poisson-distributed.
Element position test
For any permutation of {1, . . . , n} we measure the frequency of element m ending up
in position m′. We generate k permutations and build a histogram (n × n matrix)
from every 〈m,m′〉 pair. Any column and any row of the matrix should now be
Poisson-distributed with λ = k
n
. We then compute a goodness-of-fit for all rows and
columns, obtaining 2n probabilities. Had these probabilities been independent, we
could have done a KS-test for uniformity over [0, 1]. Since they are not, we can just
say that the permutation generator passes the test unless we get values p < ε or
p > 1− ε for some sufficiently small epsilon, say ε = 10−15.
From this test, we have not been able to conclude that the element positions are
anomalous. The tests were conducted for n = {50, 100, 200}.
A stronger test (that we have not conducted) would be to generate many matri-
ces, testing that any particular row/column probability is uniform over test runs.
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“Generator” Structure
D32 All bits, 1× 32
D16 Concatenation of two 16 bit outputs, 2× 16
D8 Concatenation of four 8 bit outputs, 4× 8
D7 Concatenation of four 7 bit outputs and one 4 bit output, 4× 7||4
D6 Concatenation of five 6 bit outputs and one 2 bit output, 5× 6||2
Table C.1: To generate 32-bit words to test, a concatenation of several outputs from
the PRNG may be needed.
Symbol p-value
↓ p < 10−15
⇓ p < 10−50
ε⇓ p < 10−300
↑ p > 1− 10−15
⇑ p > 1− 10−50
ε⇑ p > 1− 10−300
Table C.2: A p-value close to 0 implies that the test gives rise to a (empirical)
distribution too far from what should be expected from a random stream. A value
close to 1 implies the test gives a distribution too close to the expected distribution.
An empty slot means that the generator passed the test.
C.2 KISS generator in Delphi
Even though we have not been able to show that the Delphi PRNG leads to any
anomalous results in the original application, in the light of the test results from
TestU01 it seems prudent to replace it with a better generator. One generator that
passes “Crush” as well as “BigCrush” ([LS07]) of TestU01 is “KISS99” [Mar99].
KISS99 is easy to implement and has a fairly long period, in our implementation
> 6.5× 1036.
We also introduced a rejection sampling algorithm (borrowed from nextInt(int)
in java.util.Random). Thus the average number of calls to the PRNG is 2 in the
worst case (for an interval of [0, 231 + 1)) and exactly one call in the best case (for
an interval of [0, 2n)).
For our implementation of KISS99 in Delphi, see [EM08].
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Test p-value
name D32 D16 D8 D7 D6
1 BirthdaySpacings ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
2 Collision ↑ ↑ ↑ ε⇓ ε⇓
3 Gap ε⇓ ε⇓
4 SimpPoker ε⇓ ε⇓
5 CouponCollector ε⇓ ε⇓
7 WeightDistrib ε⇓ ε⇓
8 MatrixRank ε⇓
9 HammingIndep ε⇓
10 RandomWalk1 H ε⇓
10 RandomWalk1 M ε⇓
10 RandomWalk1 R ε⇓
10 RandomWalk1 C ε⇓
Table C.3: Test results from running TestU01’s “SmallCrush” on the Delphi system
generator.
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Test p-value
name D32 D16 D8 D7 D6
1 SerialOver, t = 2 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
2 SerialOver, t = 4 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
3 CollisionOver, t = 2 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
4 CollisionOver, t = 2 ε⇓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
5 CollisionOver, t = 4 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
6 CollisionOver, t = 4 ε⇓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
7 CollisionOver, t = 8 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
8 CollisionOver, t = 8 ε⇓ ε⇓ ↑ ↑ ↑
9 CollisionOver, t = 20 ↑ ⇓ ↑ ε⇑ ↑
10 CollisionOver, t = 20 ε⇓ ε⇓ ↑ ↓
11 BirthdaySpacings, t = 2 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
12 BirthdaySpacings, t = 3 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
13 BirthdaySpacings, t = 4 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
14+15 BirthdaySpacings, t = 7 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
16+17 BirthdaySpacings, t = 8 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
18 ClosePairs NP, t = 2 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ↓ ⇓
18 ClosePairs mNP, t = 2 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
18 ClosePairs mNP1, t = 2 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
18 ClosePairs mNP2, t = 2 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ⇓ ⇓
18 ClosePairs NJumps, t = 2 ↑ ↑ ↑ ⇓ ↑
19 ClosePairs NP, t = 3 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ↓
19 ClosePairs mNP, t = 3 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
19 ClosePairs mNP1, t = 3 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
19 ClosePairs mNP2, t = 3 ↓
19 ClosePairs NJumps, t = 3 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
19 ClosePairs mNP2S, t = 3 ε⇓
20 ClosePairs NP, t = 7 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
20 ClosePairs mNP, t = 7 ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
20 ClosePairs mNP1, t = 7 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ⇓
20 ClosePairs mNP2, t = 7 ⇓ ⇓
20 ClosePairs NJumps, t = 7 ↑ ↑ ↑ ⇓
20 ClosePairs mNP2S, t = 7 ε⇓ ε⇓
21 ClosePairsBitMatch, t = 2 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
22 ClosePairsBitMatch, t = 4 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
23 SimpPoker, d = 16 ε⇓
24 SimpPoker, d = 16 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
25 SimpPoker, d = 64 ε⇓
26 SimpPoker, d = 64 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
28 CouponCollector, d = 4 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
29 CouponCollector, d = 16 ε⇓
Table C.4: Test results 1–29 from running TestU01’s “Crush” on the Delphi system
generator.
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Test p-value
name D32 D16 D8 D7 D6
30 CouponCollector, d = 16 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
32 Gap, r = 27 ε⇓ ε⇓ ε⇓
34 Gap, r = 22 ε⇓ ε⇓
36 Run of U01, r = 15 ε⇓ ε⇓
37 Permutation, r = 0 ↑ ↑ ε⇓ ε⇑ ↑
38 Permutation, r = 15 ε⇓ ε⇓ ↑ ↑
39 CollisionPermut, r = 0 ↓ ↑
40 CollisionPermut, r = 15 ε⇓ ↑
41 MaxOft, t = 5 ↑ ↑ ↑
42 MaxOft, t = 10 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
43 MaxOft, t = 20 ↑ ↑ ↑
44 MaxOft, t = 30 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
49 AppearanceSpacings, r = 0 ε⇓
50 AppearanceSpacings, r = 20 ↑
52 WeightDistrib, r = 8 ε⇓ ε⇓
53 WeightDistrib, r = 16 ε⇓
54 WeightDistrib, r = 24 ε⇓ ε⇓
57 MatrixRank, 60× 60 ε⇓
58+59 MatrixRank, 300× 300 ε⇓
60+61 MatrixRank, 1200× 1200 ε⇓
63 GCD, r = 0 ε⇓
64 GCD, r = 10 ε⇓
65+66 RandomWalk1 H, M, J, R, C (L = 90) ε⇓
67+68 RandomWalk1 H, M, J, R, C (L = 1000) ε⇓
69+70 RandomWalk1 H, M, J, R, C (L = 10000) ε⇓
72 LinearComp, r = 29 ↑
74 Fourier3, r = 0 ε⇓
75 Fourier3, r = 20 ε⇓ ↓
77 LongestHeadRun, r = 20 ε⇓
79 PeriodsInStrings, r = 15 ↑
80 HammingWeight2, r = 0 ↑
81 HammingWeight2, r = 20 ↑
82 HammingCorr, L = 30 ε⇓
83 HammingCorr, L = 300 ↑
84 HammingCorr, L = 1200 ↑
85 HammingIndep, L = 30 ε⇓
86 HammingIndep, L = 30 ε⇓ ε⇓
87+88 HammingIndep, L = 300 ε⇓
89+90 HammingIndep, L = 1200 ε⇓
92 Run of bits, r = 20 ε⇓
95 AutoCor, d = 30 ↑
96 AutoCor, d = 10 ↑
Table C.5: Test results 30–96 from running TestU01’s “Crush” on the Delphi system
generator.
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Appendix D
Comparisons of Gk and J for
some parameter sets
Each of the figures from D.1 to D.4 compare the results of running Gk and J with
two different parameter sets. Thus a total of eight (4 times 2) distinct parameter
sets are compared in these figures.
Fig. D.1 starts by comparing the behaviour of the two programs with the goods =
7 and maxTries = 300. The results are captured in plots D.1.a, D.1.b, D.1.c and
D.1.d. Plots D.1.a and D.1.b show the mean relative prices of the goods over 300000
periods for both versions. The mean relative price of a good at some point shows
how much the price of the good differs from the equilibrium price on average (among
all the agents). So, a value of −30 at some point indicates that the mean price is
30% lower than the equilibrium price at that point. The third plot, D.1.c, is to show
the price difference of means between the first two plots (J -Gk) and the last plot,
D.1.d, shows the result of the rank-sum test over time.
The same structure repeats for the plots D.1.e, D.1.f, D.1.g and D.1.h, but for
these subplots, goods = 5. Figures D.2, D.3 and D.4 follow the same pattern.
One thing to note about the rank-sum test is that sometimes it seems to con-
tradict the price difference plot. One example is in plots D.2.g and D.2.h, where
the price difference is close to zero towards the end for both goods. Nevertheless,
the rank-sum test suggests that the prices of good 2 are different between the two
programs. This can be explained by the low variance towards the end—although
the prices seem to be close enough to the naked eye, they are not the same and
together with a low variance the rank-sum test gives a very small probability that
they have the exact same median.
For the rest of the 12 tested parameter sets, we only include the results of the
rank-sum tests (Fig. D.5). The plots D.5.f, D.5.g, D.5.i and D.5.l more or less
indicate a failure at least in the later periods. This is also in correspondence with
the KS-tests presented in Table 6.3.
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(d) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
7 goods, maxTries = 300
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(h) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
5 goods, maxTries = 300
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Figure D.1: Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the number of goods set to 5 and 7.
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(d) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, 10 agents
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3 goods, 1000 agents
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
0 10000 20000
m
ea
n
re
la
ti
v
e
p
ri
ce
(f) Prices for J ,
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(h) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, 1000 agents
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Figure D.2: Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the number of agents per good set to 10 and 1000.
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(b) Prices for J ,
3 goods, ∆mutation = 0.75
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(d) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, ∆mutation = 0.75
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(e) Prices for Gk,
3 goods, ∆mutation = 0.9975
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(f) Prices for J ,
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(h) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, ∆mutation = 0.9975
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Figure D.3: Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
∆mutation set to 0.75 and 0.9975.
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(d) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, maxTries = 3
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(h) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, maxTries = 30
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Figure D.4: Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk;
the maximum number of trade attempts set to 3 and 30.
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(a) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
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(c) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
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(g) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods, ∆mutation = 0.975
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(h) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
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(i) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
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(j) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
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(l) Rank-sum test for J & Gk,
3 goods
Legend
good 1 good 2 good 3
Figure D.5: Our implementation J compared to the original implementation Gk
showing just the results of rank-sum test; various parameters. All periods in multi-
ples of 1000.
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